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ABSTRACT
This report develops an analytical framework that assesses the macroeconomic, environmental and
distributional consequences of energy subsidy reforms. The framework is applied to the case of Indonesia
to study the consequences in this country of a gradual phase out of all energy consumption subsidies
between 2012 and 2020. The energy subsidy estimates used as inputs to this modelling analysis are those
calculated by the International Energy Agency, using a synthetic indicator known as “price gaps”. The
analysis relies on simulations made with an extended version of the OECD’s ENV-Linkages model. The
phase out of energy consumption subsidies was simulated under three stylised redistribution schemes:
direct payment on a per household basis, support to labour incomes, and subsidies on food products. The
modelling results in this report indicate that if Indonesia were to remove its fossil fuel and electricity
consumption subsidies, it would record real GDP gains of 0.4% to 0.7% in 2020, according to the
redistribution scheme envisaged. The redistribution through direct payment on a per household basis
performs best in terms of GDP gains. The aggregate gains for consumers in terms of welfare are higher,
ranging from 0.8% to 1.6% in 2020. Both GDP and welfare gains arise from a more efficient allocation of
resources across sectors resulting from phasing out energy subsidies. Meanwhile, a redistribution scheme
through food subsidies tends to create other inefficiencies. The simulations show that the redistribution
scheme ultimately matters in determining the overall distributional performance of the reform. Cash
transfers, and to a lesser extent food subsidies, can make the reform more attractive for poorer households
and reduce poverty. Mechanisms that compensate households via payments proportional to labour income
are, on the contrary, more beneficial to higher income households and increase poverty. This is because
households with informal labour earnings, which are not eligible for these payments, are more represented
among the poor. The analysis also shows that phasing out energy subsidies is projected to reduce
Indonesian CO2 emissions from fuel combustion by 10.8% to 12.6% and GHG emissions by 7.9% to
8.3%, in 2020 in the various scenarios, with respect to the baseline. These emission reductions exclude
emissions from deforestation, which are large but highly uncertain and for which the model cannot make
reliable projections.
Keywords: Computable general equilibrium model, households’ heterogeneity, fossil fuel subsidy
reforms, distributional impacts, Indonesia
JEL classification: C68, H23, O53
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1. INTRODUCTION

In many emerging countries, governments subsidise fossil fuel consumption to keep domestic prices low so
as to make energy more affordable for consumers and firms.1 According to the International Energy
Agency (IEA)’s measurement and definitions (see box 1), in 2012 worldwide fossil fuel consumption
subsidies totalled USD 544 billion, including USD 135 billion for electricity (IEA, 2013).2 The
consumption subsidies are large in some non-OECD countries. In some cases, they represent a substantial
share of a government’s budget.
For years the OECD, but also the IMF and the World Bank, have recommended that governments
“rationalize and phase out over the medium term inefficient fossil fuel subsidies that encourage wasteful
consumption” (G20, 2009). The reason is that they can induce wasteful energy consumption, be a source of
economic inefficiency, and contribute to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. They also often fail to tailor to
the most vulnerable parts of the population since they massively leak to well-off household categories.
In several oil-importing countries that subsidize energy consumption, the high internal oil prices that
prevailed until mid-2014 put pressure both on current accounts and government budgets, this context
provided incentives to reform energy subsidies. However, fossil fuel subsidies reforms were particularly
difficult to implement from a political perspective. This is not surprising since consumption subsidies are
often one of the main instruments adopted to redistribute wealth, in the absence of full-fledged social
security schemes. They are of crucial importance to support some categories of households, especially the
poorest whose consumption is close to the minimum level for subsistence. This need is especially strong in
periods of high international oil prices, as the subsidies dampen the vulnerability of households to oil price
surges.
The recent decrease of international oil prices has created opportunities to reduce fossil fuel subsidies,
which was achieved in several countries such as India and Indonesia in late 2014 and early 2015. But these
reforms may still remain fragile as international oil price increases may renew the pressure to shelter
households from strong increases in expenditures.
Redistribution schemes which reallocate the budget that was previously spent on energy subsidies can play
a crucial role to make the subsidy reforms acceptable and equitable (World Bank 2014). Examples of
redistribution schemes could include cash transfers to households, tax cuts on non-energy products
expenditures, or improved public services.
Identifying which household groups win or lose from a fossil-fuel subsidies phase out is at the heart of the
political acceptance of such a reform. Consequently, the analysis of macroeconomic and environmental
impacts is insufficient when considering energy subsidy reforms. Such analysis should be complemented
by a deeper look at their distributional consequences and the possibilities for designing compensatory
measures to alleviate negative outcomes in terms of inequality and poverty.
The ability of policy to reduce inequalities will be characterized throughout the report by its progressivity.
A policy is progressive if its net benefit as a proportion of wealth decreases with wealth3. When
1

Meanwhile, many developed countries partly subsidise fossil fuel consumption, not directly by lowering final prices, but through
tax concessions to consumers (OECD, 2013).
2
Note that in this report, the terms fossil fuel consumption subsidies and energy consumption subsidies are used interchangeably.
They embody all actions of governments to lower the final price of coal, oil, gas or fossil-fuel based electricity for both
households and firms.
3
In general, income or expenditures are used as a measure of wealth.
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considering income groups, progressivity is associated with higher benefits, as share of income, for lower
than for higher quantiles. Progressivity is also associated with a lower dispersion of wealth across the
population after the policy reform is conducted.
The circumstances which pertained in Indonesia in the period up to 20144 provide the basis for an
interesting case study for investigating energy consumption subsidy reform. Firstly, Indonesia subsidises
the consumption of electricity and oil products for both households and firms. It has kept its large energy
subsidies inherited from its previous role as an important oil producer, while it has now become an oilimporting country. Secondly, for years subsidy reforms have featured prominently in Indonesian political
discussions, and even more so in a context of high oil prices, which increases pressure on the government’s
budget and reinforces the incentive for a reform. Thirdly, the subsidy reform could help Indonesia to fulfil
its commitment made in the 2009 Copenhagen Accord and 2010 Cancún. Fourthly, Indonesia was chosen
because of the availability of public household budget survey data.

Box.1 Fossil fuel consumption subsidy : definition and measurement
The IEA (2000) has defined energy subsidies as “any government action that concerns primarily the energy
sector and that lowers the cost of energy production, raises the price received by energy producers or lowers the price
paid by energy consumers.” Fossil-fuel consumer subsidies are actions of the government that lower the price of fossilfuel-based energy paid by firms and households. Fossil-fuel-based energy sources include coal, oil and natural gas. It
also includes electricity if it is produced from fossil fuels.
The IEA estimates fossil fuel subsidies using a price-gap approach, which compares end-user consumer prices
with reference prices corresponding to the full cost of supply or, where available, the international market price,
adjusted for the costs of transportation and distribution. This approach captures all subsidies that reduce consumer
prices below those that would prevail in a competitive market. Such subsidies can take the form of direct financial
interventions by government, such as grants, tax rebates or deductions and soft loans, and indirect interventions, such
as price ceilings and free provision of energy infrastructure and services.
Simple as the approach may be conceptually, in practice calculating the size of subsidies requires a considerable
effort in compiling price data for different fuels and consumer categories as well as computing reference prices. For
traded forms of energy, such as refined petroleum products, the reference price corresponds to the export or import
border price (depending on whether the country is an exporter or importer) plus internal distribution margins. For nontraded energy products, such as electricity, the reference price is the estimated long-run marginal cost of supply.
Value-added Tax (VAT) is added to the reference price where the tax is levied on final energy sales. However, other
taxes, including excise duties, are not included in the reference price. So, even if the pre-tax pump price of gasoline in
a given country is set by the government below the reference level, there would be no net subsidy if an excise duty is
levied that is large enough to make up the difference. The aggregated results are based on net subsidies only for each
country, fuel and sector. Cases where the final price exceeds the reference price were not taken into account. In
practice, part of the subsidy in one sector, or for one fuel, might be offset by net taxes in another. Subsidies were
calculated only for end-user consumption, to avoid the risk of double counting: any subsidies on fuels used in power
generation would normally be reflected at least partly in the final price of electricity. All the calculations for each country
were carried out using local prices, and the results were converted to US dollars at market exchange rates.
Source : based on IEA (2000, 2006)

This report, based on a simulation approach, proposes an analysis of the distributional impact of energy
subsidy phase out policies in Indonesia under various redistribution schemes. The aim of the report
remains to help to understand the essential driving forces that determine the answer to the two following
questions: What type of redistribution schemes can make the phasing out of such subsidies pro-poor and
4

The results presented in this paper largely reflect the context of the first part of 2014, during a period with high energy subsidies
and high international oil prices. Since then there have been significant changes to the context. On 31 of December
2014, subsidies on gasoline were totally removed under the new government. This has been facilitated by a context of
very low oil prices. However, the question of redistribution which is the most important issue addressed in this paper
remains a crucial one as an increase in international oil price would greatly affect the population. In addition,
methodological developments presented in this paper may be used to study energy subsidy reforms in other countries.
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progressive?; and What are the trade-offs between the macroeconomic and environmental impacts of the
reform and its distributional consequences? Such a perspective will allow us to draw conclusions that can
extend, beyond the Indonesia case, to energy subsidy reforms in other countries.
To assess welfare impacts for each household group and to conduct distributional analysis, an augmented
version of the ENV-linkages Model - the OECD multi-region, multi-sector and multi-period CGE model has been elaborated. In the standard version of ENV-Linkages, regional economies feature a single
representative household portrayed by a single demand system and earning the whole regional income (see
Chateau et al., 2014a). This standard model can therefore only evaluate welfare impacts of policies at the
country level. In the augmented version of the model, the representative Indonesian household is replaced
by multiple household groups, each having its own income, expenditures and preferences. The
improvement of the model for this study has been set up in such a way that multiple households can in
principle also be characterized for other regions. This is possible once household survey data are collected
and a procedure is available to reconcile this data with the national accounting data of the model.
In this modelling framework, the Indonesian household groups are influenced by the changes in both
consumer prices and incomes induced by the phasing out of energy subsidies. The reforms directly affect
the energy prices and indirectly the prices of other goods. These indirect price effects come from the
increase in energy costs faced by firms. However, the reform also affects the disposable income of
households. Firstly by changing wage and non-wage incomes, itself the result of changes in firm behaviour
following the reform, and secondly by changing transfers and income taxation as part of the compensatory
mechanism. To the extent that these changes in prices and incomes are different across households, the
reform is expected to have distributional consequences.
The impacts of the phase out policies on different household groups depend on their characteristics, in
particular on their expenditure structures, their sources of incomes and their ability to adjust their demand
to changes in incomes and prices. For instance, the higher the budget share for energy products and the
lower the reaction of energy demand to price is, the more a household may suffer from the effect of the
phase out, unless their income is sufficiently raised by compensatory measures.
It is important to realise that the model used is stylised. Firstly, while substantial efforts have been made to
produce a dataset that reflects the income and expenditure information available in the household budget
survey, some extrapolations were necessary. Secondly, there is uncertainty about the behaviour of the
households and consequently on the projected adjustments of their consumption patterns to price changes.
Nonetheless, the modelling improvements overcome the major barrier to a fully integrated analysis, i.e. the
specification of differentiated endogenous responses of households to policy shocks. This integrated
approach is superior to the more limited ex-post analysis of distributional effects that is often carried out
with microsimulation models.
This report is organised as follows. Section 2 puts forward the role of the energy subsidy system in
Indonesia and the possible consequences of its reform. The methodology used for simulating energy
subsidy reforms is presented in Section 3. The household data set constructed for the simulation analysis is
described in Section 4. Then, Section 5 presents the phasing out policies that are simulated. The results of
the policy simulations are presented in Section 6 and analysed in terms of economic, environmental and
distributional performances. Section 7 concludes. Additional technical material is provided in the various
appendices of this report.
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2. OVERVIEW OF THE ENERGY CONSUMPTION SUBSIDIES IN INDONESIA
The Indonesian government subsidises the consumption of electricity and oil products for both households
and firms. These subsidies, as measured using the price gap approach (see Box 1) are large given that the
country is a net energy importer. In 2011, Indonesia was ranked the 10th country in the world in terms of
total government expenditures on fossil fuel consumption subsidies (see Figure 1) following mostly big
energy exporters (e.g. Iran, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iraq, UEA and Venezuela) and larger economies (e.g.
China and India). Figure 2 shows that Indonesia, was ranked 18th for the share of energy subsidies in terms
of gross domestic product (2.5%). The only oil-importing countries with a higher share were Egypt,
Ukraine, Pakistan and Bangladesh. However, in Indonesia the subsidies per capita, amounting to USD 88,
were higher than in Bangladesh and Pakistan.
Energy subsidies absorb a considerable amount of budget resources. In recent years spending on subsidies
became very high. For example, in 2011, energy subsidies rose to 29% of the Central government’s
expenditures (Dartanto, 2013). Furthermore, spending on energy subsidies was, in 2012, slightly higher
than the government’s investment in infrastructure (Diop, 2014). Finally, until 2010, the Indonesian
government spent more on energy subsidies than on defence, education, health, and social security
combined (Cheon et al., 2013).
Indonesia’s trade and financial situation is very sensitive to changes in international oil prices and domestic
energy demand. Recently, a combination of increasing oil prices and the stabilization of raw material
prices, which traditionally represent a large share of Indonesian export, gave way to a significant
worsening of the country’s trade position. This situation led to a current account deficit in 2012, after
almost 15 years of surplus, and to a small depreciation of the Rupiah.5
The energy subsidies, which are a burden and a source of unpredictability for the economy, also perform
badly in terms of redistribution. Given that commercial energy consumption increases with income, the
subsidies benefit wealthier households more (Mourougane, 2010). According to IEA (2012), in 2010 27%
of Indonesians did not have access to electricity6, mostly in rural areas (IEA, 2012). Agustina et al. (2008)
mention a World Bank calculation which estimated that in 2007, 70% of fuel subsidies were received by
the wealthiest 40% of households.
Fuel subsidies, by encouraging fossil-fuel burning, increase GHG emissions, as well as local air pollution.
However, it is important to note that in Indonesia, energy related CO2 emissions have a rather limited but
increasing contribution to overall GHG emissions. In 2010, they represented about 20% of total GHG
emissions while the contribution of CO2 from tropical forest was around 61%. Energy related emissions of
CO2 from fuel combustion have increased rapidly over the recent period (4.1% annual growth rate from
2005 to 2010). Appendix A provides more detailed information on the links between energy consumption
and GHG emissions.
There has been a large increase in the CO2 emissions from the power generation and transportation sectors
(7% and 7.6%, respectively, in annual growth rate from 2005-2011). Driven by an expanding demand from
households and industries, power generation has increased at a quick pace, while still relying largely on oil
and coal technologies. Fuel consumption for transportation has also increased considerably (at 7.7% annual
growth rate from 2005-2011), with a large contribution from trucks and buses.

5
6

IMF World Economic Outlook data base, April 2014.
See

http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/resources/energydevelopment/definingandmodellingenergyaccess/
definition of access to electricity.

7

for

the

IEA
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Figure 2. Energy consumption subsidies per capita and as share of GDP in 2011 in selected countries
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In 2011, traditional biomass still represented almost 74% of final energy use in the residential and service
sectors due to the high reliance on this fuel type by households. There is thus a concern that a reform of
energy consumption subsidies might increase deforestation due to the substitution to wood from kerosene
whose price would increase. Even if some (relatively old) empirical studies discard this effect (Dick, 1980;
Pitt, 1983), its potential negative impact on overall GHG emissions should not be ignored even if they are
beyond the scope of this paper.

8

Box 2 Fossil fuel subsidy reforms in Indonesia
Since the late 1990s, there have been substantial efforts in Indonesia to reduce energy consumption subsidies.
Since the early 2000s, the fossil fuel subsidy mechanism has been progressively reformed. In 2001, fuel prices for
industrial users were anchored to 50% of international prices (Dartanto, 2013). In 2004-2005, as a result of an increase
in international prices there was a rise in fossil fuel subsidy expenditure (Dartanto, 2013; Mourougane, 2010).
In 2005, energy consumption subsidies were partially cut and energy prices for households and small businesses
were very strongly increased (Dartanto, 2013; Mourougane, 2010). On the one hand, the higher consumer prices
introduced in 2005 lifted temporarily the pressure on public finances. But on the other hand, the fact that the price setting
mechanism was made independent of market price made the arrangement unsustainable in the context of surging
international oil prices; and consequently successive readjustments were needed.
To limit the impact of the 2005 reform on the poorest households, the Bantuan Langsung Tunai (BLT) unconditional
cash transfer programme was introduced (Mourougane, 2010; Miranti et al., 2013). This programme, working through
the postal system, concerned more than 19 million households who received a monthly a payment equivalent to USD 10
during 12 months in 2005-2006.*
In 2008, electricity subsidies ceased for large industrial consumers and for households beyond a certain
consumption threshold (Mourougane, 2010) in order to limit the pressure on public finances. During the same year, the
Gasoline, Diesel and LPG prices were increased. As a compensation for households, a new wave of BLT was run over 9
months in 2008-2009. In addition, some existing anti-poverty programmes mechanisms were reinforced, including
distribution of rice and control on rice prices, education and school support and to small businesses. In 2010, the
average electricity price increased for most consumers, including households (IISD, 2012). In 2012, there was an
attempt to prohibit government and four-wheeled vehicles from using subsidized gasoline. However, the attempt was
abandoned due to strong public opposition. In the end, only government vehicles were excluded from the subsidies
(IISD, 2012).
In May 2013, in a context of degradation of the current account, increasing government budget deficit and
international credit rate downgrade, the revision of the budget of the Indonesian government introduced increases of
diesel and gasoline prices by 22% and 44%, respectively (IEA, 2013). The increases were accompanied by a large
compensation package of around USD 2.6 billion. As described by IISD (2014), it included USD 1.5 billion for temporary
cash transfers to 15 million households, and extension of existing cash transfers programs, USD 0.7 million for poverty
alleviation programs focused on infrastructure and USD 0.7 billion to support poor students and schooling.
Note: * Statistics about the BLT programme can be found on the ILO website:
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/ilossi/ssimain.viewScheme?p_lang=en&p_geoaid=360&p_scheme_id=3162

There have been several quantitative assessments of the macroeconomic, environmental and distributional
impacts of a phase out of energy subsidies in Indonesia and selected references are presented in Table 1.
Nevertheless, to our knowledge there has not been any study taking into account the three impacts
simultaneously, or considering the reforms in a multi-period setting.
The results of the various studies are not fully comparable, as they correspond to different base years,
energy subsidy reforms and modelling approaches. The studies do not agree whether the impact on GDP is
positive or negative, but the effect can be substantial: ranging from +3.7% to -2.4%. The assessments
based on a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) analysis, which is essentially an Input Output (IO) approach,
give negative effects on GDP, primarily because these models are not suited to account for the
redistribution of the government budget that is no longer spent on subsidizing energy. 7 The CGE
approaches (Magné et al. 2014;Yusuf et al., 2010), give positive impacts in the long run, as the termination
of subsidies leads to a reallocation of inputs, consumption and government budget that increases economic
efficiency (reducing the deadweight losses due to the subsidies). Nevertheless, CGE model analysis can
show negative effects in the short run due to nominal wage rigidities8. When assessed, the impacts on CO2
emissions are quite substantial ranging from -17.0% in (Magné et al., 2014), to -6.7% in Yusuf et al.
(2010).
7

Furthermore, in the SAM approach, the households’ expenditures are constant and the proportions of inputs used in the various
production sectors are fixed. A drop in subsidies involves a negative shock a decrease in households demand and a contraction
of output and GDP. In the CGE models, it is possible to operate substitutions between inputs and the subsidy reform can give
way to a more efficient reallocation of the production factor which can be beneficial GDP and households’ welfare.
8
The reason is that in the short-run nominal wage rigidities can lead to a loss in aggregate employment.
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Table 1.

Selected assessments of the impact of energy demand subsidy reforms in Indonesia

Authors and method

Type of reform*

Macroeconomic
impact**

Impact on
CO2 from
fuel
combustion**

Distributional impact**

IEA (2000): Partial
equilibrium model
(feedback on GDP)

Phase out of all energy
consumption subsidies
(with 1995 as a base
year)

GDP increases by
2.4%***

-10.97% in
2020

n/a

World Bank (2006):

October 2005 package
(fuel price adjustment
and cash transfers)

n/a

n/a

Progressive largely through
gasoline expenditures effects;
progressivity improved by the
cash transfers

25% final consumer price
increase

Real output reduction of
1.6% in the short run no
reduction in the long
run

n/a

Poverty increase but limited in
the short run. And even more
limited in the longer run. The
urban households are more
affected. The poverty

October 2005 package
but with alternative
recycling schemes

GDP decreases from
1.72% to 2.42% in the
short run

n/a

Progressive and more
detrimental to urban highincome households. Poverty
effect can be offset by recycling
schemes e.g. by cash transfers

Phase out of all fossil fuel
subsidies

GDP decreases by
0.5% in the short run;
and increases by 0.43%
in the long run

-6.7%

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

Richer households receive more
energy subsidies (in absolute
terms) than poorer households,
especially for gasoline
subsidies.

Removal of fuel
subsidies by IDR 1 billion

GDP decreases by IDR
88 million but support to
some sectors of the
economy can mitigate
this effect

n/a

Rural households less affected.
Recycling schemes that
supports agriculture protect rural
household through income and
lower-class urban households
through expenditures.

25% to 100% removal of
fuel subsidies with
alternative recycling
schemes

n/a

n/a

25% removal of fuel subsidies
increases poverty by 0.26
percentage points. But recycling
with government development
spending reduces poverty even
if they are 50% less important
than the subsidy removal.

Multilateral phase out of
all energy demand
subsidies (gradual,
achieved in 2020)

GDP increases by 3.7%
in 2035

-17% in 2035

n/a

Household micro data

Clements et al (2007):
SAM
Information on household
group,
Yusuf and Resosudarmo
(2008):
CGE model with shortrun nominal rigidities
Information on several
household groups
Yusuf et al (2010)
CGE model with shortrun nominal rigidities
World Bank (2011)
Descriptive statistics
based on survey

Widodo et al (2012):
SAM

Dartanto (2013)
CGE model combined in
top down fashion with
survey data

Magné et al., (2014)
CGE model

*Note that in some of the papers mentioned, various fossil fuel consumption subsidy reforms (in terms of product coverage and redistribution
schemes) were envisaged. But not all the reforms are reported in this table.
** w.r.t. baseline. *** 10 years after the reform, based on the result of the IEA (2000) that estimates to 0.24% the annual additional GDP growth
rate.

Source: Authors’ review, inspired by Mourougane (2010)

The studies in Table 1 are generally in line in terms of their evaluation of distributional impacts. The direct
effect of the subsidies phase-out reform, due to the increase in final consumer prices, will benefit more
proportionally to low and middle income households. This progressivity is largely due to the decrease of
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subsidies on gasoline (World Bank, 2006, 2011). In the SAM-based models, mainly because of the
negative effects on GDP, the reform increases poverty. In addition, the reform affects the urban more than
the rural poor (Clements et al., 2007; Yusuf and Resosudarmo, 2008; Widodo et al., 2012). However, it
also appears, from the various studies that redistribution schemes, for instance with cash transfers or
subsidies on food products, can be efficient in alleviating poverty. For Dartanto (2013), investing in
infrastructure and introducing cash transfers can contribute, using only 50% of the government’s
expenditures saved via the subsidy reform, to a significant reduction in poverty. It shows that the subsidy
reform can both reduce poverty and consolidate the government’s budget.

3. THE MODELLING APPROACH

The modelling approach developed for this report is designed to assess the impacts of phasing out the
energy consumption subsidies on the welfare of households through their income and expenditure.
Because households are different, both in terms of their income structures and their expenditures pattern,
they will be affected differently by the reform. At first sight, households that spend a relatively large
fraction of their income on energy will be, ceteris paribus, more penalized by the subsidy phase out
because of thee direct effect of higher energy prices. However, it is not straightforward to assess the total
effect for these households, as all the indirect effects through changes in commodity prices and income
have to be taken into account.
The “expenditure effect” is primarily due to the change in final consumption prices of the energy goods,
consecutive to the subsidies phasing out reform. But other commodity prices, in particular those of energy
intensive goods, are also influenced, to the extent the reform will modify energy cost faced by the firms. In
turn, as consumers shift away from energy and energy-intensive goods, demands for other commodities are
affected as well. In addition, the reform will lead to various adjustments throughout the economy, causing
prices to change. For instance, final fuel prices will not only be influenced by the changes in the subsidies,
but also as a result of a new equilibrium between supply and demand. Last, in a budget neutral setting,
prices may be affected by a decrease in taxes and an increase of subsidies on specific goods. The
magnitude of these tax and subsidy changes depends on the budget resources that were made available by
the initial phasing out of energy subsidies.
Households will also be impacted through changes in their earnings, as the subsidy reduction may impact
the rate of return on labour, land or capital.9 The relationship depends on the structure of production,
including the degree of substitutability between energy and other inputs, and on the ability of households to
change their sources of income. In a budget-neutral setting the phasing out of the subsidies may also
include additional transfers or changes in income tax, which further alter the disposable income of certain
categories of households.
To capture how the policies affect the sources of income of the various household groups and the
affordability of the various goods they consume, it is necessary to combine a micro-level representation of
9

The main reason is that the phasing out policy will decrease the quantity of energy used as input in the production sectors. It will
change, in turn, the marginal productivity of the production factors, such as labour, capital and land, which are
combined with energy in the production activities. Finally, the remuneration rate of the production factors, which is
equal to their marginal productivity, is impacted by the policy reform.
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households’ incomes and consumption with a macroeconomic model that translates policy shocks into
changes in final prices, and remuneration rates of production factors, taxes and subsidy rates. A
simultaneous representation of the effects described above can only be obtained by fully integrating
multiple households into a detailed multi-sectoral model (ENV/EPOC/WPCID(2013)20).
The macroeconomic model used in this paper is the OECD ENV-Linkages model (Chateau et al., 2014a).
ENV-Linkages is a dynamic global and multi-sectoral computable general equilibrium (CGE) model,
which focuses on the linkages between different sectors in different economies and is especially suited to
assess the direct and indirect effects of policy shocks. For this study ENV-Linkages has been improved by
directly integrating a module describing the behaviour of more than 10,000 representative household
groups for Indonesia. In other regions, the final consumers are portrayed by a single representative
household.
The characteristics of the representative household in terms of preferences and endowments are based on
national accounting data. The multi-household representation for Indonesia is based on integrating this
macroeconomic information from the social accounting matrices with data from the fourth edition of the
“Indonesia Family Life Survey” (IFLS4) realised in 2007 (Strauss et al., 2009). 10
The household-level information from the survey data and the social accounting matrices from the model
were reconciled to specify the parameters of the household module for Indonesia, ensuring that the sum of
incomes and expenditures across the various household groups are consistent with country-level totals that
are used in ENV-Linkages. Details about the reconciliation procedure are given in Appendix B.
For consistency, the household-specific demand systems are based on the preferences of the single
households used in the standard version of the model. They are based on the same form of extended linear
expenditure system (Chateau et al., 2014a) that represents demand for the various goods and services. The
household-specific demand functions are calibrated using the survey data and the aggregate elasticity
values of the CGE model that describe how consumers respond to changes in income or relative prices (see
Appendix C for more details).
The structure of the individual Indonesian households’ demand function is represented in Figure 3. In the
standard version of the ENV-Linkages model, the representative Indonesian household consumes a single
non-electric fuel aggregate. However, in the extended version of the model, taking advantage of additional
information on fuel use provided in the survey, each household group can consume four types of nonelectric energy goods: kerosene, liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), gasoline and diesel. Moreover, energy
demands are aggregated into two categories: the first one represents energy use for transportation and the
second one energy services for domestic use (lighting and cooking). The first aggregate combines gasoline
and diesel; the second aggregate combines kerosene and LPG. The proportion of fuels within these
aggregates are household-specific and calibrated on the reconciled survey data.

10

For the fourth wave of the IFLS survey, 13,535 households were interviewed between late 2007 and early 2008. The survey
which covers 13 out of 33 Indonesian provinces is representative of 83% of the Indonesian population (Strauss et al.,
2009). The National Socioeconomic Survey (SUSENAS), which is representative of Indonesia and has a sample size
over 300000 households, could have been used for a more in depth analysis. For more information about SUSENAS :
http://www.rand.org/labor/bps/susenas.html.
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Figure 3. Structure of the households’ utility functions
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The households earn incomes from the remuneration of production factors they own. The endowments of
labour, land and natural resources of each household group are assumed to be fixed, but the endowments in
capital are endogenously determined as a result of households’ savings decisions. The households also
receive income from the government through transfers.
The direct integration of the full set of Indonesian households within the mathematical formulation of the
ENV-Linkages model is impossible because of the high number of equations representing individual
households exceeds the capacity of the modelling framework. For this reason, based on the decomposition
algorithm of Rutherford et al. (2006), the CGE model and the household-level model have been formulated
separately and adjusted iteratively until convergence (see Appendix D). The key advantage of this
approach is that the model can endogenously represent the behaviour of many household groups, taking
into account not only the effect of the macroeconomic reactions on individual households’ income and
expenditures, but also the feedback effect of their differentiated response on the macro economy. Such
feedback effects are potentially significant, and missing in more traditional models that perform the
distributional analysis ex-post through a stand-alone microsimulation model.

4. OVERVIEW OF THE RECONCILED HOUSEHOLD SURVEY DATA

It is important to present the reconciled household data that are used as inputs in the model. Firstly,
because this data set is a construction, elaborated from different sources, sufficient information must be
provided to make comparisons possible with other data. Secondly, by considering the budget shares of
energy in total consumption by household quantiles, it will be possible to evaluate whether, based on these
data, the current subsidy scheme is progressive or regressive. Thirdly, a presentation of these data will help
to understand which element of the household heterogeneity drives the distributional impact in the various
scenarios.
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Figure 4. Shares of energy in total expenditures by income decile group
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on IFLS4 and ENV-Linkages

Figure 5. Share of each income decile in total energy subsidies received and in total income
Share of total households' income*

Share of total electricity consumption subsidies received

Share of total fossil fuel consumption subsidies received

%
35

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
deciles

Note: * e.g. the incomes of the 10th decile households represent 33% of the total incomes of all the Indonesian households.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on IFLS4 and ENV-Linkages

The reconciled household data are a key input for simulating the distributional impacts of the phasing out
of the fossil-fuel consumption subsidies. In particular, the budget shares of energy consumption drive the
effects on the household groups through expenditures. Three points need to be underlined concerning the
reconciled household data.
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First, the households who provided no information on any income or expenditure category or on housing
(19% of the respondents) were dropped during the processing of the survey data11. If the poor households
with no commercial energy consumption were overrepresented in these categories, the budget shares of
energy for the poor might have been overestimated.
Secondly, the imputation of the IFLS4 survey data into social accounting categories can miss some
important information. For instance, it was not possible to properly identify in IFLS4 data which
households had access to electricity and whether electricity consumption corresponded to the payment of
subsidized energy. Consequently, the simulations might overestimate the impact of an energy subsidy
phase out, particularly for the rural poor households, which have often no access to electricity.
Lastly, during the reconciliation with social accounting data, the income and expenditure shares of each
household in IFLS4 are adjusted12.
Despite the attention paid to ensure the consistency of the reconciled survey data, the assessment regarding
the distributional impacts of the current subsidy scheme remains illustrative, because survey data are
always unsatisfactory to catch-up well the information concerning the two extremities of the households
distribution (the poorest and the wealthiest). In addition, the robustness of the policy simulation results to
the income and consumption structure of the various groups is subject to the quality of the reconciliation
process.
Figure 4 shows that, the budget shares of fossil fuels (kerosene, LPG, gasoline, diesel) are below 3.3%, and
that of electricity is below 1.6% for all the income deciles. These estimates are low, compared with other
survey data (BPS, 2011). This is a direct consequence of the reconciliation process where the more robust
macroeconomic information is inconsistent with the information of the survey, aggregated over all
households. To overcome this problem, households’ energy expenditure has been adjusted to match the
aggregate energy expenditures of the social accounting data.
The budget share of fossil fuels increases with income until the 4th decile then stabilizes and decrease
decreases significantly after the 8th decile to its lowest level in the last decile. World Bank (2006) also
shows a decrease after the 8the decile but up to this decile the budget shares clearly increase with income.
The budget share of electricity uniformly decreases with income, although one could expect to see, as in
other survey data survey data (BPS, 2011), the smallest budget shares for the low income households,
reflecting the lack of access to electricity for the poor, especially in rural areas. Thus, it seems that our
reconciled data overestimate the electricity consumption of low income households.
As Figure 5 shows, until the 8th income decile, the share of the total subsidy payment received (the light
grey bars for electricity and the light blue bars for fossil fuels) is higher than the total share of households’
income (the dark blue bars). It means that the subsidies reduce inequalities between the lower 8 deciles and
the top 2 deciles. In general, the lower the decile, the more the share of subsidy received exceeds the share
of the group’s income in total Indonesian households’ income. Based on these considerations, even if in
absolute terms the subsidies benefit the wealthiest households the most (since energy consumption
increases with income), the subsidy scheme can be labelled as progressive. However, the progressivity is
not very strong, and insufficient to contribute substantially to the reduction of the income inequalities
observed in Indonesia.

11

This was a modelling choice. The other alternative was a full reconstruction of the income, expenditure and housing data for
some household categories.

12

For instance, the shares were scaled down for energy consumption. Lower share for energy consumption will induce in the
simulations less direct effect on the household groups through expenditures as a response to an energy subsidy phasing
out compared with what could be expected from the original IFLS survey data.
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Table 2 gives the budget shares for urban and rural households by energy type and by income decile. Total
energy expenditures are a higher fraction of consumption expenditures for urban than for rural households.
The budget share of the fuels used in transportation (gasoline and diesel) tends to increase with income up
to the 8th decile. Consequently, subsidies on these products can be regarded as regressive. The share of
expenditures for domestic fuels (Kerosene and LPG) and for electricity decreases with income, showing
that subsidies on these products are clearly progressive.
Table 2. Budget shares of energy products for urban and rural households
Decile
Urban and rural

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Electricity
Fossil fuels
Gasoline and diesel
Kerosene and LPG
Total Energy

1.6
2.4
1.3
1.1
4.0

1.5
2.8
1.8
0.9
4.3

1.4
2.9
2.0
0.9
4.4

1.3
3.2
2.4
0.8
4.5

1.3
3.1
2.0
1.1
4.4

1.2
3.0
2.1
0.9
4.3

1.3
3.1
2.2
0.8
4.3

1.2
2.9
2.2
0.7
4.0

1.1
2.4
1.7
0.7
3.5

0.9
1.7
1.3
0.5
2.7

Electricity
Fossil fuels
Gasoline and Diesel
Kerosene and LPG
Total Energy

2.0
3.2
2.0
1.2
5.2

1.6
3.4
2.3
1.1
4.9

1.5
3.4
2.3
1.2
4.9

1.4
3.8
2.8
1.0
5.2

1.5
3.6
2.4
1.2
5.1

1.4
3.7
2.6
1.1
5.1

1.3
3.5
2.6
0.9
4.8

1.4
2.9
2.2
0.8
4.3

1.2
2.4
1.7
0.7
3.6

0.9
1.7
1.2
0.5
2.6

Electricity
Fossil fuels
Gasoline and Diesel
Kerosene and LPG
Total Energy

1.5
2.0
1.0
1.0
3.5

1.5
2.5
1.6
0.9
3.9

1.4
2.7
1.9
0.8
4.0

1.3
2.8
2.1
0.8
4.1

1.2
2.7
1.7
0.9
3.8

1.1
2.5
1.7
0.7
3.6

1.2
2.6
1.8
0.7
3.7

0.9
2.8
2.1
0.7
3.7

0.9
2.5
1.8
0.7
3.4

0.9
1.9
1.4
0.5
2.8

Urban

Rural

Source: Authors’ calculations based on IFLS4 and ENV-Linkages

Figure 6 shows that the budget share of food consumption (food products and agricultural products)
decreases with income. The low shares result from the reconciliation of the IFLS4 with social accounting
data, where the aggregate shares of food and agricultural product consumption for Indonesia are relatively
low. However, the reconciliation preserved the ratio of 2 between the shares of the first and last decile that
was observed in the original IFLS4 survey data.
Figure 6 also shows how the structure of income varies between the decile groups. Firstly, the share of
income coming from capital is higher for the top deciles. Secondly, even though the total share of labour
income is relatively stable across deciles, the share of formal labour income increases with total income.13

13

Following Miranti et al. (2013), we defined formal sector employees as regular employees and employers with permanent
workers, while informal sector employees cover all employees with status of non-permanent, unpaid, casual and family
workers.
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Figure 6. Structure of expenditures (left) and incomes (right) by income decile
Electricity
Transportation services
Manufactured goods

Gasoline and Diesel
Agricult ural products
Services

Kerosene and LPG
Food products

100%

100%

90%

90 %

80%

80 %

70%

70 %

60%

60 %

50%

50 %

40%

40 %

30%

30 %

20%

20 %

10%

10 %

0%

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

0%

9
10
deciles

1

La bour (f ormal)

Labour (inf ormal)

Capital

La nd

Natural resource

Transfers

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
deciles

Source: Authors’ calculations based on IFLS4 and ENV-Linkages

5. DESCRIPTION OF THE ILLUSTRATIVE SUBSIDIES PHASE-OUT POLICY SCENARIOS

The macroeconomic projections follow the OECD Economic Outlook and the corresponding long-term
projections (Chateau et al., 2014a). The energy assumptions used in the baseline scenario are those of the
current policy scenario (CPS) from the World Energy Outlook 2013 (IEA, 2013; Chateau et al., 2014b).
For all the regions, all the energy policies, assumed after 2011 in the CPS scenario, are taken into account
except the reforms to the consumers’ energy subsidies.14
Following the illustrative scenario designed for the simulations contained in the joint report by IEA,
OECD, OPEC & World Bank for the G20 (2010), and in line with Burniaux and Chateau (2014), the
policy scenarios assume that, between 2012 and 2020, Indonesia implements a gradual (e.g. linear) phase
out of all electricity and fossil fuel subsidies for households and firms (Figure 7). The reform applies to the
existing electricity and other fuel subsidies for household’s final energy demands and the intermediate oil
product consumption subsidies for firms. The subsidies to firms for their intermediate consumption of oil
14

More detail on the calibration procedure can be found in Chateau et al. (2014b) who describe how the IEA scenarios are
reproduced in ENV-Linkages.
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products are lower than the subsidies on electricity and oil consumption received by households.
Therefore, the phase out is expected to have much larger impacts on households than on firms.
Figure 7. Trajectories of energy consumption subsidy rates in the policy scenarios
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Notes: (1) ) For households the subsidy rate for oil products is an aggregate rate over the average oil product
consumption basket, including Kerosene, LPG, Gasoline and Diesel. (2) The subsidy rates given here are gross (S)
and not net (NS). To compute the net subsidy rate, tax rates (T) on energy products must be substracted (NS=S-T).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on IFLS4 and ENV-Linkages

The scenarios differ by the compensating scheme for households they assume. Each of them is budgetneutral and financed by the decrease in subsidy expenditures. The compensating schemes include cash
transfers, subsidies on food products, and a decrease in labour income taxation. Note that the scenarios are
relatively stylised, since, for each of them, the compensation given to households is based on a single
redistribution instrument although, in Indonesia, several were used in the same reform (see Box 2). For
instance, cash transfers and food subsidies can be combined. Furthermore, other destinations of the avoided
subsidy payments may also be considered, not least the reduction of government deficits or the expansion
of public services, such as education and health care. Unfortunately, this wider set of compensating policy
reforms could not be simulated in the model, which focuses purely on redistribution schemes that directly
affect the income and private expenditures of households.15 Nonetheless, the illustrative scenarios
presented in this report give precious insights about the strengths and weakness of the components of
potential fuel subsidy phase out policy reforms.
In the cash transfer scenario, the subsidy reform is compensated by unconditional cash payments on a perhousehold basis. Each household receives the same amount. Given the high level of existing income
inequality, such a redistribution mechanism is a powerful instrument to reduce relative income inequalities,
even if absolute income differences are unchanged. Another key attractiveness of this redistribution
scheme is that cash transfers do not distort relative prices, as they are not linked to specific sources of
income or expenditures. They are therefore economically efficient. However, in practice cash transfers may
not be easy to implement. This scenario, albeit stylised, relates to the Bantuan Langsung Tunai

15

The reason for this is technical: the private welfare effects of changes in the provision of public services cannot be evaluated by
the model. Hence, only redistribution schemes that directly affect private welfare and leave government expenditures
unchanged can be consistently compared in the modelling framework.
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unconditional cash transfer programmes, implemented in Indonesia in 2005-2006 and in 2008-2009 to
compensate the decrease in energy subsidies (see Box 2).
In the food subsidy scenario, the phasing out is accompanied by an increase in the subsidies on food
products. The rationale for this scenario is that if cash transfers are not an option, subsidies on energy can
be replaced by support for other basic commodities that are less carbon-intensive. The downside of this
option is that it artificially alters market prices. In addition, it is a less efficient, indirect way of supporting
poor households. This reform is expected to benefit poorer households more than proportionately, given
that the budget share of food decreases with income (see Figure 6). Even if it has larger food product
coverage and targets all households in a non-discriminatory way, this scenario relates in certain aspects to
the Rice Subsidy for the Poor programs, known as RASKIN, that were introduced in Indonesia on several
occasions since the late 1990s16 and also to the distribution of rice and support to rice price that were used
following the 2008 energy price rise (see Box 2). Note that OECD (2012) stressed that such narrowly
targeted programs have important negative side-effects and may be detrimental to food security.
In the labour support scenario, the households are compensated by receiving payments proportional to
their labour income from the formal sector; this can take the form of reduced tax rates on labour, or if the
compensation is larger than the existing tax rate, a subsidy on labour income. This stylised scenario
assumes that such labour subsidies will be made available to the worker of the formal sector only,
excluding those of the informal sector. The policy in this scenario is in line with the OECD green growth
strategy (OECD, 2011) that recommends devoting extra fiscal resources from green taxation to lower
labour income taxation. While the labour support scenario may be close to the cash transfers scenario in
developed economies, in countries with a large informal sector and high unemployment rates such a policy
reform may not reach the poorest households. The decrease in labour income taxation is regarded as
levelling relative income inequalities in OECD countries, given that the share of rental income increases
with total income. Consequently, the decrease in labour taxation can limit the potential regressive effect of
a green tax reform. However, this type of scenario is expected to have very different implications in
emerging countries like Indonesia where the informal sector is very important, and may not be effective as
a support measure for the poorest households.
The cash transfer multilateral scenario corresponds to the cash transfer scenario, but in a context of a
global multilateral subsidy phase out. This scenario aims at showing that the outcomes of the reform in
Indonesia depend on whether other countries also decide to phase out subsidies. If the phase out is
multilateral, the global energy demand will decrease and so are the world energy prices, these import price
reductions can in turn partially offset the inflationary impact of the subsidy reform on final energy prices,
thus limiting the detrimental effect of the decrease in energy subsidies for households. Note that the
regional impacts of the cash transfer multilateral scenario in terms of changes in real income and GHG
emissions are summarised in Appendix E.

6. SIMULATION RESULTS

For each phase out scenario, the outcomes of the models are compared to the baseline scenario, where the
subsidies remain at their 2011 levels. Besides the distributional impacts, the economic efficiency and
16

Statistics about the RASKIN programme can be found on the ILO website:
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/ilossi/ssimain.viewScheme?p_lang=en&p_geoaid=360&p_scheme_id=3153
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environmental impacts of the policy reform will also be considered. The efficiency of the reforms will be
assessed by looking at both the variations in GDP and the variations in the aggregate consumers’ real
income equivalent (as a welfare indicator). Climate benefits are measured by the changes in GHG
emissions. Other environmental benefits, such as improved local air quality, can unfortunately not be
assessed within the current framework.
6.1 Overview of the size of the redistribution of the avoided subsidies
Table 3 shows the magnitude of the impact of the phase-out policies, including the redistribution of the
avoided subsidy payments, on transfers, subsidies for food products, and labour incomes in the various
scenarios. In the cash transfer and cash transfer multilateral scenarios, the budget resources redistributed
through the cash transfers for households is projected to increase from 0.5% to 2.5% of GDP between 2012
and 2020. In the short and medium run, the volume of redistribution under these scenarios are of a similar
magnitude as the two waves of the BLT cash transfers programmes that were introduced in 2005-2006 and
2008-2009 in Indonesia, which represented approximately 0.8% and 0.3% of GDP, respectively. However,
as progressively all subsidies are phased out, by 2020 a large amount of budget resources that were
previously used to subsidise energy is available for redistribution. The long-run budget redistribution
would be very large in comparison to most of the major cash transfers programs that have been introduced
in other countries so far (ILO, 2013). In the food subsidy scenario, the redistribution implies an increase in
subsidies for the consumption of food and agricultural products that will reach an average rate of 16% in
2020. In the labour support scenario, the subsidy on labour earnings reaches and average rate of 4.8% in
2020.
Table 3. Effect of the phasing out on transfers and subsidies in the various scenarios

2011

2012

2014

2016

2018

2020

Cash transfer & Cash Transfer multilateral scenarios
Cash Transfers to households (as % of baseline GDP)

0.0

0.5

1.2

1.7

2.1

2.5

Subsidy rate on food and agriculural products*

-

-

-

-

-

-

Subsidy rate on labour income**

-

-

-

-

-

-

Cash Transfers to households (as % of baseline GDP)

-

-

-

-

-

-

Subsidy rate on food and agriculural products*

0

3.2

8.3

12.0

14.9

16.2

Subsidy rate on labour income**

-

-

-

-

-

-

Cash Transfers to households (as % of baseline GDP)

-

-

-

-

-

-

Subsidy rate on food and agriculural products*

-

-

-

-

-

-

Food subsidies scenario

Labour support scenario

Subsidy rate on labour income**
0
0.9
2.5
3.4
4.2
4.8
Notes: * Aggregate rate over the average agriculture and food product basket in addition. In addition, this rate is gross
(S) and not net (NS). To compute the net subsidy rate, an average tax rate of 5.7% on agriclture and food products
must be substracted. ** Average rate, over both formal and informal labour income.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on IFLS4 and ENV-Linkages

6.2 Macroeconomic impacts
The direct effect of the energy subsidies reform, regardless of the redistribution mechanism scenario, is
that energy prices for all consumers (firms and households) are raised. The consumer prices of other goods
are also indirectly affected through changes in producer costs, which reflect changes in energy costs, and
adjustments of all relative prices to ensure that general equilibrium is maintained. The second set of
channels through which the reform impacts households is through changes in income. The third set of
channels is through the redistribution of the government budget that is no longer spent on subsidizing fossil
20

fuels, which characterize each of the scenarios considered here. By considering the entire chain of impacts
on demand and supply for each good and service, the model projects the quantitative impact of the reforms
on GDP.
Figure 8 shows the changes in final consumer price indexes for various groups of commodities in 2020, as
deviations from the baseline. The cash transfer, the cash transfer multilateral and the labour support
scenarios give way to a significant increase (close to 3.5%) in the real consumer price index (CPI), which
represents a basket of all consumed commodities.17 In contrast, the food subsidy scenario leads to a
decrease in consumer prices, as the reduced consumer price of subsidised food products dominates the
increase in the price of the other products.
Figure 8. Effect of the energy subsidies' phasing out on final consumer prices in 2020
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Unsurprisingly, as the final energy commodity prices are directly targeted by the subsidy phase out, they
are most impacted. In 2020, in all scenarios, fuel and electricity prices are respectively about 80% and
100% higher than in the baseline. The increase in fuel prices is slightly more limited in the cash transfer
multilateral scenario because of an indirect effect through global energy markets. In this scenario, the
phasing out of energy subsidies in other regions negatively affects global oil demand and consequently
lowers international oil prices. This reduction in price partly compensates the domestic impacts of the
subsidy phase out on final energy prices. However, the small difference in fuel prices with the other
scenarios shows that this effect remains limited.
The prices of non-energy commodities are affected indirectly by the phase out. Firstly, through change in
production costs, which in turn reflect mainly the changes in energy costs. Secondly, as households and
17

The model only calculates real prices and does not reflect monetary information such as inflation. Nominal prices would be
increasing by the sum of the CPI change plus the inflation rate. Furthermore, please note that all prices are relative to a
numéraire, which is a basket of export prices of OECD countries.
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firms substitute away from energy they will increase their use of other goods and services. The price of
transportation services is the most affected because of the high dependence of the sector on motor fuels,
though the price increase remains limited to 7% with respect to the baseline. For the other non-energy
goods, the increase is lower than 1%. These relatively modest indirect impacts on non-energy commodity
prices are largely due to our assumption that the base-year energy subsidies rates were significantly lower
for firms than for households. Because of this assumption, the phase out corresponds to a much bigger
energy price shock for households than for firms.
The negative impact on food prices in the food subsidy scenario, observed in Figure 8, stems from the
indirect effects of the tax and subsidy system through the redistribution scheme. In this scenario, the
phasing out of energy subsidies is compensated by fiscal support on food prices. Under the assumption that
government resources are identical to those of the baseline scenario, this subsidy, which reaches an
aggregate rate close to 16% over the food product basket (see Table 3), significantly lowers final food
prices.
As a result of higher energy prices, demand for energy goods will decrease for final consumers, as shown
in Table 4. The large decreases observed are directly related to the values of the own price elasticities of
demand, which follow Chateau et al. (2014a), and are close to -1 (see section 6.5 for a sensitivity analysis
on this parameter). However, changes in the demand for other goods and services are a priori
indeterminate because they result from a mix of an income effect (through changes in transfer payments
and earnings from production factors) and a substitution effect (through changes in relative prices).
Table 4. Total households’ demand variations for aggregated good categories in 2020 by scenario

Cash transfers
Electricity
Fuels
Transports
Foods products
Manuf. goods
Services
Note: % deviations, w.r.t. the baseline

-47.8
-42.7
-3.7
2.0
2.3
3.5

Cash transfers Labour support Food subsidies
multilateral
-47.3
-48.2
-49.3
-39.7
-42.8
-44.2
-2.0
-3.1
-5.6
2.1
1.6
12.1
2.4
3.1
0.1
3.4
4.4
1.1

Source: Authors’ calculations based on IFLS4 and ENV-Linkages

The phase out also affects the real return on production factors net of the factor tax rates as shown in
Figure 9. The changes in net return reflect variations in the relative marginal productivities of the factors
induced by the policy. In the case of labour productivity in the labour support scenario it also reflects
changes in the subsidies on formal labour.
The lower real return on capital induced by the phase out policy, which appears in the longer run, is related
to higher household savings created by the subsidy reform18: as will be explained later in this section, the
policies are projected to increase the savings of households. The higher savings increase the capital stock
and thus decrease its marginal productivity.
The net return on labour is negatively impacted in the cash transfer and cash transfer multilateral
scenarios. A decrease in net return, which, as in the case of capital can be explained by complementarities
between energy and labour, leads to a decrease in the marginal productivity of labour. In the labour
18

Except in the food subsidy scenario where savings decrease.
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support scenario the subsidy to labour will increase the net return on labour, but the situations are different
for the formal and informal sectors. Informal labour is not part of the official tax system, and hence does
not receive the labour support subsidies and its rate of return decreases, reflecting the lower marginal
labour productivity. Formal labour is subsidised at a rate close 6.8%, which dominates the decrease in
labour marginal productivity and hence yields a higher net return. These differentiated effects on different
segments of the labour market are illustrated in Figure 9, together with the effect on the whole labour
market. In the food subsidy scenario, the subsidies on food products are beneficial to the agricultural sector
and to its workers, positively affecting real labour remuneration at the national level.
The relative decrease in the return on land in all the scenarios except food subsidy is due, as for labour and
capital, to the complementarity with energy in the production process. But as expected, in the food subsidy
scenario, the food subsidies that compensate for the energy subsidy phase out support the demand for food
products and thereby increase the return on land.
Figure 9. Net real return rates by income sources in the various scenarios in 2020
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* In the labour support scenarios, in addition to the avrage remuneration rate of labour; the remuneration rates of
formal and informal labour are distinguished.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on IFLS4 and ENV-Linkages

Figure 10 shows that the impact of the energy subsidy reforms on GDP is positive in all the scenarios.
However, the gains remain very limited, until 2020 they are not higher than 0.7% above the baseline.
These limited gains are explained by the modest share of energy consumption in total household
consumption, which limits the potential impacts of the subsidy reform on the overall economy. The best
scenarios in terms of GDP couple the subsidy reform with cash transfers redistribution schemes. As the
subsidy phase out improves the efficiency of the economy and increase the growth rate of the economy,
they lead to GDP gains, whereas the food subsidy and the labour support scenarios have smaller GDP
gains, which eventually start to fade away.
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To explain the macroeconomic performance of the policy in the inter-temporal modelling framework, it is
necessary to make the distinction between “static” and “dynamic” mechanisms. The static mechanisms
relate to reform-induced changes in the efficiency of production factors and consumption goods allocation
for a given stock of capital. Typically, subsidies create inefficiencies (deadweight loss) in the allocation of
consumption goods and factors, and removing them tends to have a positive direct effect. In addition, the
redistribution schemes influence the efficiency of the policy, when they affect other existing taxes. The
dynamic mechanisms come from the impact of the policy on households’ savings. A reform, whose
consequence is an increase in aggregate savings, and consequently capital accumulation in the economy,
will have better long-term GDP growth performances.19
The subsidy removal has a positive direct impact on the economy, since it reduces allocation inefficiencies.
However, depending on the scenario, the recycling schemes adopted may create new inefficiencies in the
economy. The lump-sum transfers used in the cash transfer and cash transfer multilateral scenarios do not
create inefficiencies because they do not influence production factor allocation. Similarly, given that total
labour supply is exogenous, the redistribution through changing the net sum of taxes and subsidies on
labour in the labour support scenario does not affect the supply of labour from households and is in that
sense equivalent to a lump-sum transfer. However, in the food subsidies scenario, the redistribution
consists of reducing existing food taxes during the first years and then introducing subsidies on food
products as the avoided energy consumption subsidy payments become larger than the baseline tax
revenues on food products. The reduction of food taxes tends to have an immediate positive impact on the
economy, as an existing price distortion is reduced. This explains the slight better growth performance in
this scenario than in the other scenarios during the first year of the model horizon. However, the subsidies
on food products appear after a few years and create inefficiencies that partially offset the positive impact
of removing energy consumption subsidies.
Figure11 shows that the policies have a significant impact on the capital stock by presenting the ratio
between the two most important production factors, capital and labour (in efficiency units, i.e. including
human capital). The cash transfer, the cash transfer multilateral and the labour support scenarios induce
more capital accumulation. In these scenarios, households receive additional income and part of it is saved.
However, the impacts on capital accumulation are more pronounced with cash transfers than with labour
support. This difference stems from the heterogeneity of households. The budget redistribution schemes
target different parts of the population (all households in the cash transfer scenarios, and households with
formal labour income in the labour support scenario) which have different marginal propensities to save.
Consequently, the choice of the redistribution scheme affects total savings: for the same amount
redistributed, the cash transfer mechanism will give way to higher aggregated savings.20
Savings rates, and hence capital accumulation, are also influenced by the changes in consumption prices.
As seen in Figure 8, the consumer price index increases in all scenarios except the food subsidy scenario.
Hence, consumers are induced to substitute away from consumption toward saving. The food subsidies, in
contrast, make consumption more attractive, thereby pushing savings rates down.

19

In particular if, as in this study the current account is fixed.

20

For instance, in the base-year, a labour support mechanism that accrues the formal labour income revenue by 1% gives way to
0.16% increase in aggregate savings. If an equivalent amount is redistributed with cash transfers, the aggregate savings increase by
0.33%.
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Figure 10.

Real GDP as percent deviation to the baseline in the various scenarios
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Figure 11.

Capital to efficient labour ratio, as % variation from the baseline
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6.3 Distributional impacts
The measure of welfare used to assess the distributional impacts of the phase out of fossil fuel subsidies is
the equivalent income21 (EI) which translates the welfare reached by a household group in a policy
scenario into the level of income that would have been necessary to reach the same level of utility in the
baseline scenario. The variation of the EI between a policy scenario and the baseline is called equivalent
21

This welfare measure excludes the welfare derived from the provision of public goods, as this cannot be measured properly. As
long as the provision of public goods is constant across scenarios, as is the case in the scenarios investigated in this
paper, the change in welfare from private consumption equals the change in total welfare.
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variation in income (EV), it represents the additional income that would have been necessary to reach the
same level of welfare in the baseline scenario. A first criterion used in this report to regard a policy as
progressive is that the EI are more evenly distributed than the baseline incomes 22. A second criterion if that
the EV, as a percent of the baseline income, decreases with income.
The total welfare changes for all households together are displayed in Figure 12. The gains are more
important than the effect on GDP shown in Figure 10. They range between 0.8% and 1.4% in 2020, while
the corresponding range for GDP gains is from 0.4% to 0.7%. The difference between the two indicators is
that the welfare measure fully takes into account the terms of trade improvements consecutive to the
reform. This effect is stronger in the cash transfer multilateral scenario, since lower international oil prices
reinforce the decreased value of energy imports. Consequently, this scenario outperforms all the others in
terms of welfare improvements.
Figure 12.

Total households’ equivalent income variations in the various policy scenarios
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Table 5 shows statistics of the distribution of equivalent incomes for the year 2020 under the various
scenarios. Two dispersion statistics, the Gini and the Theil indexes, provide insight on whether the policies
give way to higher or lower overall inequalities than in the baseline, and can, in this sense, be regarded as
progressive or regressive. In the cash transfer and cash transfer multilateral scenarios, the Gini and the
Theil indexes significantly decrease; therefore with regards to these criterions these scenarios can be
regarded as progressive, in the sense that poorer households benefit more than richer households from the
reforms. The dispersion statistics hardly change in the food subsidy scenario, which therefore can be
regarded as distribution neutral, but they increase in the labour support scenario which appears to be
regressive.
The inter-quantile ratios show that the progressivity of the cash transfer and cash transfer multilateral
scenarios comes from the fact that they are relatively beneficial to the poorest decile. First, in these two
scenarios, the gap between the highest and the lowest quantiles decreases. The ratio between the 99th
centile and the 1st centile shrinks from 45 to about 39, and the ratio between the 95 th and the 5th centile
decreases from 14.2 to 12.7 as the lump sum payment is a relatively large part of their total income. In
addition, in these scenarios, the households in the 5th centile have a welfare increase of more than 9%. The
22

Note that by construction, in the baseline scenario, the EI is equal to income.
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increase in welfare is also very important in the 10th centile. This means that these policies are primarily
beneficial to the very poor. A diminishing ratio between the highest and lowest quantiles and a significant
welfare increase are also observed, but to a lower extent, in the food policy scenario. However, the labour
support scenario sees an increase in the ratios between higher and lower quantiles.
Table 5. Equivalent income dispersion statistics across households in 2020 by scenario

Baseline

Cash transfers

Scenario
Inequality indexes*
Gini coefficient*
Theil Index

0.445
0.348

0.436
0.336

Cash transfers
multilateral
0.436
0.336

Labour tax

Food subsidies

0.450
0.357

0.443
0.346

Inter-quantile ratios
Decile 8/Decile3
2.4
2.3
2.3
2.4
Decile 10/Decile 1
8.2
7.6
7.6
8.4
Centile 95/Centile 5
14.2
12.7
12.7
14.6
Centile 100/Centile1
45.2
39.0
38.9
46.4
Average equivalent income variations (in %) per quantile groups
Centile 5
9.1
9.2
-1.2
Centile 10
6.8
6.9
-0.9
Centile 90
-0.1
0.2
1.5
Centile 95
-0.2
0.0
2.0
Note: *The inequality indexes are computed on the per capita and not on the per household distribution of equivalent incomes

2.3
8.1
14.0
43.8
2.1
2.5
0.0
0.2

Source: Authors’ calculations based on IFLS4 and ENV-Linkages

Figure 13 shows for the various scenarios the EV by income centile groups in 2020 and thus provides more
details about the distribution of the gains and losses due to the policies. As the EV are expressed as percent
deviation from the baseline, a scenario where EV decreases with income quantile can be interpreted as
progressive as it denotes that the lower the initial income, the higher the proportion of income-equivalent
gained from the policy.
All the scenarios yield positive welfare impacts (the EV is positive) for the majority of the household
centile groups, showing that most of the households gain from the reform. This reflects, at the household
group level, the positive macroeconomic impacts of the scenarios. In addition, except for the labour
support scenario, the EV is higher for the lowest centile groups, confirming that these scenarios are
progressive.
The cash transfer and cash transfer multilateral scenarios have very similar impacts across the household
groups. They are the most progressive and they benefit all household groups except the very rich. This
result is largely due to the natural progressivity of unconditional cash transfer schemes (the payments
received by the households are identical and therefore represent a much higher share of income for poorer
households than for richer ones) reinforced by the fact that in Indonesia, the initial level of inequality is
high.
The food subsidy scenario is the only scenario investigated that is beneficial to all income centiles. The
relative benefit of the reform is higher for the lowest centiles, due to their larger share of income going
toward food and agricultural product consumption (see Figure 6). The labour support scenario is
regressive, and detrimental to lower income household groups.
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Figure 13.

Welfare variations by income centiles in 2020 in the various policy scenarios
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The evolution of the EV by income centiles through time in the cash transfer scenario is displayed in
Figure 14. The distributional pattern is more or less constant throughout the years, and the effects amplify
over time, in line with the larger policy shock. In addition, for low-income households, the policy has a
significant positive impact in the short run, as welfare improvement is more rapid during the first years
after the reform. In addition, these figures show that even a partial phase out of energy consumption
subsidies complemented by cash transfers can be progressive.
Figure 14.

Dynamic of welfare variations by income centiles in the cash transfer scenario
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To identify the main drivers of the distributional impacts of each reform the welfare changes of the
household groups is decomposed into the following effects:
1.

The direct effect of the final price changes, i.e. the change in expenditures that would have
occurred in the absence of household demand response.

2.

The effect through change in labour income: the change in income that comes from the variation
in the return on labour. This latter reflects not only the change in labour marginal productivity,
but also, in the case of the labour support scenario, the introduction of the subsidies on labour.

3.

The effect of the change in non-labour incomes (i.e. incomes from capital, land and natural
resources).

4.

The effect through higher transfers that increase households’ disposable income. The indirect
component of this change is provided by the fact that as government tax revenues change, the
government budget is balanced by endogenously adjusting the transfers to households. In the
cash transfers and cash transfers multilateral scenarios, this also includes the direct effect of the
redistribution scheme.

5.

The effect through demand adjustment, which takes into account the impact on of the adjustment
of consumption and savings made by the households as a response to the changes in incomes and
relative prices.

These components are shown in Figure 15 for the cash transfer scenario. The model simulation projects
that the direct effect of the policy through changes in final prices is regressive. The effect is equivalent to a
5% decrease in income for the lowest centile groups, but to less than 3% for the wealthiest groups. The
effects through labour and non-labour incomes are quite small and more or less distribution neutral. The
effect of demand adjustment is positive and distribution neutral.23 Note that the large predominance of the
transfer effect makes the assessment about the progressivity of the cash transfer reform very robust to the
statement, made in section 2, that the initial energy consumption subsidy scheme is progressive. The
overall progressivity of the cash transfer scenarios is hence almost entirely due to the changes in transfers.
When considering the effects under the labour support scenario, in Figure 16, it appears that the regressive
impacts through changes in net labour incomes reinforce the regressivity of the final price effect. This
result is counter-intuitive given that the effect of labour income was distribution-neutral under the cash
transfer scenario, translating relatively homogenous shares of labour incomes across the household
centiles. However, the explanation comes from the very nature of the budget redistribution scheme.
Transfers proportional to labour income, as used in the labour support scenario are regressive, as the
incomes from formal labour are a higher proportion of total incomes for higher-income households than for
lower-income households (see figure 6).
Figure 17 shows that under the food subsidy scenario, the final price effect changes sign. In this scenario,
the subsidies on food products are sufficiently progressive to offset the regressive impacts of the increase
in final energy prices. The progressivity of the food subsidies is due to the higher budget shares of food for
poor households relative to rich households (see Figure 6). In addition, in this scenario, the non-labour
income effect is relatively progressive, due to the positive impacts of the food subsidies on land returns

23

This neutrality comes from the fact that the income and price elasticities of demand of the various household groups were
calibrated to the same value (the value used in the single household version of ENV-Linkages). If sufficient data can be
found, follow-up analysis could investigate the impacts of the policy reform in a setting where households have
different elasticities.
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(see Figure 9) and to the relatively high proportion of revenue from land in low-income households’
incomes24 (see Figure 6).
Figure 15.

Decomposition of welfare effects across income centiles in the cash transfer scenario
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Figure 16.

Decomposition of welfare effects across income centiles in the labour support scenario
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24

However, this result is not necessarily robust, as the land incomes of low income rural households may be overestimated in the
reconciled household survey data. It is likely that the land incomes of urban high-income landowners are
underestimated.
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Figure 17.

Decomposition of welfare effects, by income centiles in the food subsidy scenario
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The phasing out of fossil-fuel subsidies has different impacts in urban and rural areas, as shown by Figure
18. Until the 9th decile, the cash transfer and the food subsidy scenarios are more beneficial to rural than to
urban households. The main reason is that, according to our data25, the rural households have a lower share
of their initial budget for energy expenditures and therefore they are less affected by the impact of the
reform on final energy prices. The labour support scenario, in contrast, is less beneficial to the rural
households, because of the greater importance of the informal sector in these areas. Due to the higher share
of food product consumption in rural than in urban areas, and to an increase in land returns, the food
subsidy scenario is more beneficial to rural than to urban households26.
Figure 18.

Welfare impacts for the urban and rural household by income decile in 2020
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25

BPS (2011) also found higher value shares for food and agricultural products in rural than in urban areas.

26

Note that this result might be influenced by a potential underestimation of the role of self-consumption and in-kind private
transfers for rural households.
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The cash transfers scenarios are the most progressive, but they are very stylised. They assume a
redistribution of the expenditures that are no longer spent on subsidies to all households, who receive the
same payment, whether they are poor or better off. In practice, cash transfers may be only a part of the
distribution schemes and also be better targeted to a specific part of the population. A natural question
concerning the cash transfer is what percentage of the money saved by the subsidy reform needs to be
redistributed to mitigate the effect of the policy for some parts of the population.27 Figure 19 shows that to
avoid losses in the real income of all the household decile groups, including the wealthiest, almost 70% of
the government’s expenditures avoided by the energy subsidy reform has to be redistributed with cash
transfers. This relatively high percentage is largely explained by the amount that would be used to support
the high income household groups. If one focuses on maintaining the real income of the population that is
e.g. below the 4th decile, the percentage drops to 10%.
Figure 19.

Rate of redistribution needed to preserve real income up to a given income decile group
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6.4 Environmental impacts
Table 6 shows that the policy reform is projected to lead to a 7.9% to 8.3% reduction in GHG emissions at
the 2020 horizon when compared with the baseline. The reduction of GHG is mainly due to a 10.8% to
12.6% decrease in energy-related CO2 emissions, in line with the decrease in energy consumption (ranging
from 10.9% to 12.7%). However, the emission reductions exclude emissions from deforestation, which are
large but highly uncertain and for which the model cannot make reliable projections. The IEA estimates
that in 2010, CO2 from forest fires were about 60% of total GHG emissions (Appendix A). Hence, the
emission reductions achieved by the energy subsidy policy phase out are substantially lower when
including deforestation emissions.
Largely, the emission-reduction efforts are achieved by energy conservation and not by a reduction of the
CO2 intensity of energy. The mitigation effort is borne by households, who reduce their energy
consumption by 42% to 46%, whereas energy consumption by firms declines by only 4.9% to 6.2%. This
effect is mainly due to the much lower energy consumption subsidy rates for firms than for households in
the baseline.
27

This calculation assumes non-negative income effects at the decile level. Within decile, individual households with a-typical
characteristics may still be worse off from the policy reform.
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Table 6.

GHG emission and energy consumption reduction in 2020 w.r.t. the baseline by scenario

Scenario
Cash transfers
Cash transfers multilateral Labour support Food subsidies
All GHG*
7.9
7.3
8.3
7.9
CO2 emissions*
11.8
10.7
12.3
12.6
Total energy consumption
12.1
10.8
12.5
12.7
Households
44.6
42.3
44.8
46.0
Firms
5.8
4.7
6.2
6.2
* Not including the emissions from tropical forest fires and the 10% of biofuel combustion emissions, which is the fraction
assumed to be produced unsustainably
Source: Authors' calculations based on IFLS4 and ENV-linkages

The achieved reduction of energy consumption varies across household deciles, as shown in Figure 20. The
cash transfer scenarios lead to a lower energy consumption reduction for the lowest income quantiles. This
sort of rebound effect is due to the increase of income, which stimulates all demands including energy
consumption. On the one hand, the low income households have a direct incentive to consume less energy
due to increased final prices. On the other hand, their income increases significantly thanks to the cash
transfers they receive, which tends to stimulate their energy consumption and to offset part of the energy
consumption reduction that was due to the direct effect through energy prices.
Figure 20.

Rate of reduction of energy consumption by household decile in the various scenarios
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6.5 Sensitivity of the results to the households’ demand elasticities
The simulation results may be largely driven by the assumptions about the households’ income and price
elasticities of energy demand. In particular, the large amount of emissions reduction realised by households
in the various scenarios is largely related to the calibration of the price elasticities of households’
electricity and fuels demands close to -1 (cf. Chateau et al., 2014a)28.
28

This value is used in many CGE models like ENV-Linkages, while partial models for the energy sector often use values closer
to -0.5 (Webster et al., 2008).
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To assess the robustness of the results to the values taken by households’ income and price elasticities of
energy demand, a sensitivity analysis is conducted on these parameters. This sensitivity analysis is done for
the cash transfer scenario. The simulation results already presented will be regarded as the “standard” case
and compared to two other values of the incomes and price elasticities of demand, each corresponding to a
case.


A “high income elasticity” case, where the households’ income elasticities of electricity and fuel
demand that are close to 1 in the standard case are doubled.



A “low price elasticity” case, where the households’ own price elasticities of electricity and fuel
demand that are close to -1 in the standard case are halved.

The GDP trajectories obtained for the cash transfer scenario under the various elasticity values is displayed
in Figure 21. The GDP changes remain positive. They are rather robust against the income elasticity of
energy demand. However, the price elasticity of demand plays a greater part. A lower price elasticity of
energy demand implies significantly lower GDP gains. Two reasons can be invoked. First, a lower
elasticity of demand decreases the initial deadweight losses due to the energy consumption subsidies,
which limits the efficiency gains obtained with the phase out. Second, as the consumers are less responsive
in their energy consumption, they have more difficulties to adjust their behaviour. In particular, they
increase their savings less and thus contribute less to the growth of the capital stock.
Figure 21.

Real GDP sensitivity to demand elasticities in the cash transfer scenario
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Table 7 shows that the price elasticity strongly influences households’ energy consumption, as could be
expected, and consequently their CO2 emissions. With the price elasticity of households being divided by
two, their energy consumption reduction is half as strong as the in standard case. Consequently, the impact
on total CO2 emissions and total GHG emission is less pronounced. In contrast, the income elasticity does
not influence the results much.
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Table 7.

GHG emission and energy consumption reduction in 2020 w.r.t. the baseline in the sensitivity
analysis

Cash transfers
(standard)

cash transfer (high income
elasticity)

cash transfers (low
price elasticity)

Scenario
All GHG*
7.9
7.6
6.8
CO2 emissions
11.8
11.4
4.5
Total energy consumption
12.1
11.6
7.2
Households
44.6
42.9
23.5
Firms
5.8
5.5
4.0
* Not including the emissions from tropical forest fires and the 10% of biofuel combustion emissions, which
is the fraction assumed to be produced unsustainably
Source: Authors' calculations based on IFLS4 and ENV-linkages

Even if the price elasticity of demand largely influences the environmental and economic performance of
the cash transfer policy, it has very limited effect on its distributional performances. Table 8 shows that the
dispersion statistics of the equivalent incomes of households are robust to the price elasticity. The overall
distributive pattern is also robust, as shown in Figure 22. Of course, this result does not extend to the
situation where different income and price elasticities are assumed for different household groups. There is
unfortunately insufficient information to investigate such a situation.
Table 8. Sensitivity of welfare dispersion statistics in 2020 to demand elasticity values

Baseline
Scenario
Inequality index
Gini coefficient
Theil Index
Inter-quintile ratios
Dec8/Dec3
Dec10/Dec1
Cent95/Cent5
Cent100/Cent1

Cash transfers
(standard)

cash transfer
(high income
elasticity)

cash transfers
(low price
elasticity)

0.445
0.348

0.436
0.336

0.436
0.336

0.437
0.337

2.4
8.2
14.2
45.2

2.3
7.6
12.7
39.0

2.3
7.6
12.7
39.0

2.3
7.6
12.7
38.9

Source: Authors' calculations based on IFLS4 and ENV-linkages
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Figure 22.

Welfare gains by centile in 2020 for alternative demand elasticities in the cash transfer scenario
cash transfer (standard)

14

cash transfer (high income elasticity)

cash transfers (low price elasticity)

%

12

10
8
6
4
2
0

-2

1

11

21

31

41

51

61

71

81

91
income centile groups

Source: Authors' calculations based on IFLS4 and ENV-linkages

7. CONCLUSIONS

This paper provided a quantitative assessment of fossil-fuel subsidy reforms in Indonesia. It introduced an
enhanced modelling framework, by combining the OECD’s dynamic general equilibrium model ENVLinkages with a dedicated module for assessing the distributional consequences of reform for specific
household groups in Indonesia.
The illustrative simulations investigated in this report suggest that it is possible to reconcile the economic
environmental and distributional performances of the policy reform. The phase out of energy consumption
subsidies contributes to a 10% to 12% decrease in energy-related CO2 emissions and to a 7.3% to 8.3%
decrease in GHG emissions at the 2020 horizon compared with the baseline. These emission reductions
exclude emissions from deforestation, which are large but highly uncertain and for which the model cannot
make reliable projections. The IEA estimates that in 2010, CO2 from forest fires were about 60% of total
GHG emissions. Hence, the emission reductions achieved by the energy subsidy policy phase out are
substantially lower when including deforestation emissions. Since most of the initial subsidy rates for
energy consumption were relatively low for industries and high for households, the emissions-reduction
effort is mainly driven by households who decrease their energy consumption by 42% to 46%. All the
scenarios give way to positive impacts on GDP at the 2020 horizon (+0.4% to +0.7% in 2020 with respect
to the baseline), due to a decrease in the deadweight loss associated with the subsidies and also, in some
scenarios, to higher savings and investment. The good economic performance of the cash transfer
scenarios does imply a somewhat smaller improvement in environmental performance, as the general level
of economic activity is larger. The food subsidies recycling scheme is the best option in terms of emissions
reduction, though this is largely due to the less positive impacts on GDP.
Concerning the distributional impacts, the scenario projections suggest that for households the direct effect
of the subsidy reform, arising from higher energy prices, is regressive, especially in urban areas, and that
the effect through incomes is distribution neutral. However, the redistribution schemes can make the total
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effect of the reform progressive and pro-poor. The cash transfer scenario is the most progressive among
the scenarios investigated here. As cash transfers increase the incomes in the lowest income quantiles, they
lead to a lower decrease in energy consumption and associated CO2 emissions for these household
categories. The budget redistribution using food subsidies is less progressive than with cash transfers, and
the effect on GDP is less positive, as the food subsidies generate new inefficiencies and induce less savings
and investment. Transfers proportional to labour income, as used in the labour support scenario are
regressive, as income earned from formal labour represents a higher proportion of total income for higherincome than for lower-income households. This poor distributional performance comes along with less
positive impacts on GDP than in the case of food subsidies, but gives way to very similar levels of
emission reduction.
However, it is necessary to consider the feasibility of such mechanisms and their performance with respect
to other mechanisms that were not included in this paper’s policy scenarios. Cash transfers, if used as the
sole way to compensate households for the phasing out of the energy subsidy, would reallocate a fraction
of domestic wealth almost equivalent to the one previously managed by energy subsidies: more than 2.5 %
of GDP. The feasibility and the transparent implementation of such massive cash transfer programmes over
long periods of time can be questioned. Alternatively, cash transfers might be limited and targeted to more
specific household groups. However, over time the mechanism is not without problem, as entitlement to
the cash transfers can create dependence to these and interplay with the activity choices of households at
the expense of their contribution to economic growth. In addition, the implementation of large-scale and
long-lasting cash transfer systems represents, for the public authorities, a challenge comparable to the
implementation of a full-scale social-security system. For these reasons, cash transfers can be also
considered as a transitional response to the decrease in energy subsidies. In this case, their role is to limit
the detrimental effects on poor households in the short and medium term, while they would be replaced in
the longer run, by alternative destinations for the avoided subsidy expenditures.
This report represents an advance in the work of the OECD on the distributional impacts of environmental
policies. The methodology developed, integrating detailed information on household behaviour in a fullscale socioeconomic model, is set up such that the analysis can be expanded to other countries. Countries
like China, Egypt, India, Ukraine or Thailand also rely on energy subsidies to households. However,
differences in local circumstances will influence the numerical results and warrant separate studies. But
more generally, the modelling framework lends itself well to the analysis of the trade-offs associated with
environmental policies between economic efficiency, environmental effectiveness and equity in both
OECD and non-OECD countries. However, some limitations of the approach used in this report need to be
underlined in order to better interpret the main outcomes and identify possible direction for future work.
Firstly, even though the report uses an advanced modelling framework that combines a micro and a macro
approach, the policies investigated are defined at a macroeconomic level, in terms of a stylised reallocation
of monetary flows from the government to households. This approach tends to abstract from the
institutional context of Indonesia. This context is an essential bottleneck which restraint the possibility of
efficiently compensating poor households and therefore the political feasibility of the subsidy reforms. For
instance, as mentioned by World Bank (2014), “the implementation of cash transfers raises concerns on the
amount of time and human and institutional capacity that may be needed for their effective
implementation”. To represent the institutional bottlenecks and the role of social security systems, the
modelling approach would need several refinements; in particular it should be based on much more
detailed data and an extended representation of existing policies. This would be indeed a full research
program and would require collaboration with Indonesian counterparts.
Secondly, the current modelling framework is limited in terms of the redistribution mechanisms that could
be analysed. It cannot represent in-kind transfers, supports to energy efficiency (for instance by the
distribution energy-saving light bulbs), provision of public services and investment in infrastructure that
would be made possible by an energy subsidy reform. Development of infrastructure for water or energy,
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and the provision of public services in particular for health and education might be very beneficial to the
livelihood of the poor, reduce inequality and become a source of long term growth. However, simulating
such policies, as well as their economic, environmental and distributional impacts, remains a challenge and
is beyond the current capabilities of the modelling framework.
Thirdly, it is important to underline the necessary limitations of a welfare analysis based on household
surveys. The underlying assumption is that all the households face the same prices and that they have
access to all the commodities. But in practice, different households can face different prices, depending on
their location, on access to commodities. Further work would be needed in order to better take into account
the differences in local prices and accessibility in households’ welfare measurement.
Fourthly, the representation of households’ sources of revenue remains very simplified. The choice of
activities by the households is not represented. Their labour supply is given and not influenced by changes
in wages or by policies that favour the formal sector. Moreover the workers are assumed to be fully mobile
across the production sectors and therefore it is not possible to address the bottlenecks associated with the
change in the structure of activities or the some potential benefits of mechanisms that encourage accession
to the formal sector. In addition, differences in saving behaviour of households between different income
groups and the implied responsiveness to the policy reform should be investigated in more detail, since it
presents a major feedback to the macro economy.
Lastly, an extension of the modelling framework to other countries can be severely limited by the
availability of suitable data (see Appendix F) and by the fact that reconciling detailed budget survey data
into the macroeconomic model is very time consuming. Hence, future research could be oriented towards
less data intensive approaches by focusing on fundamental mechanisms at play in the trade-offs between
economic, environmental and social performance of green growth policies. Such stylised analysis could for
example focus on looking at different portions of the labour markets (e.g. through differentiating skill
categories) or use synthetic indicators of household heterogeneity to mimic distributional consequences.
Finally, distributional consequences of green growth policies extend beyond households, and it may also
be worthwhile to study the differences in regional and sectoral impacts of green growth policies, thereby
creating a link to competitiveness issues.

38

REFERENCES

Agustina, C. D., J. Arze del Granado, T. Bulman, W. Fengler,M. Ikhsan (2008), “Black Hole or Black
Gold? The Impact of Oil and Gas Prices on Indonesia’s Public Finances” Policy Research Working
Paper 4718, The World Bank East Asia and Pacific Region Pacific Poverty Reduction and Economic
Management Unit, September 2008.
BPS (2011), Expenditure for consumption of Indonesia, based on SUSENAS 2011 first Quarter, BPSStatistics Indonesia,
http://www.bps.go.id/eng/hasil_publikasi/flip_2011/3201004/index.html?pageNumber=34
Burniaux, J. and J. Chateau (2014),“ Greenhouse gases mitigation potential and economic efficiency of
phasing-out fossil fuel subsidies”, International Economics, Vol. 140, pp. 71-98.
Chateau, J., R. Dellink and E. Lanzi (2014a), "An Overview of the OECD ENV-Linkages Model:
Version 3", OECD Environment Working Papers, No. 65, OECD Publishing, Paris.
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5jz2qck2b2vd-en.
Chateau, J., B. Magné and L. Cozzi (2014), "Economic Implications of the IEA Efficient World Scenario",
OECD Environment Working Papers, No. 64, OECD Publishing, Paris.
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5jz2qcn29lbw-en.
Cheon, A., J. Uperlainen and M. Lackner (2013), “Why do governments subsidize gasoline consumption?
An empirical analysis of global gasoline prices, 2002-2009”, Energy Policy Vol. 56, pp. 382-386.
Clements, B., H.-S. Jung and S. Gupta (2007), “Real and Distributive Effects of Petroleum Price
Liberalization: The Case of Indonesia,” Developing Economies, Vol. 45(2), pp. 220-237.
Dartanto T. (2013), “Reducing fuel subsidies and the implication on fiscal balance and poverty in
Indonesia: A simulation analysis”, Energy Policy, Vol. 58,pp. 117–134.
Dick, H. (1980), “The Oil Price Subsidy, Deforestation and Equity”, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic
Studies, Vol. 16(3), pp. 32-60, DOI: 10.1080/00074918012331333829.
Diop, N. (2014), “Why is reducing Energy Subsidies a Prudent, Fair and Transformative policy for
Indonesia?”, World Bank Economic Premise, No. 136.
EC (2010), “The distributional impact of imputed rent in EU-SILC”, Eurostat Methodologies and Working
Papers.
Flues F., and Thomas A., forthcoming, The distributional effects of energy taxes, Tax Policy Working
Paper, OECD.
Golan, A. and G. Judge (1996), “Recovering information in the case of underdetermined problems and
incomplete economic data”, Journal of Statistical Planning and Inference, Vol. 49(1), pp. 127-136,
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0378-3758(95)00033-X.
G20 (2009), G20 Leaders’ Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit, September 24 – 25, 2009.

39

IEA (2000), World Energy Outlook 1999: Looking at Energy Subsidies: Getting the Prices Right, OECD
Publishing, Paris. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/weo-1999-en.
IEA (2006), World Energy Outlook 2006, OECD Publishing, Paris.
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/weo-2006-en.
IEA (2010), World Energy Outlook 2010, OECD Publishing, Paris.
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/weo-2010-en.
IEA (2011), World Energy Outlook 2011, OECD Publishing, Paris.
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/weo-2011-en.
IEA (2012), World Energy Outlook 2012, OECD Publishing, Paris.
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/weo-2012-en.
IEA (2013), World Energy Outlook 2013, IEA, Paris. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/weo-2013-en
IEA, OECD, OPEC & World Bank (2010), Analysis of the scope of Energy Subsidies and Suggestions for
the G-20 initiative, IEA, OPEC, OECD, World Bank Joint Report, Prepared for submission to the
G-20 meeting, Toronto (Canada).
IISD (2012), “A citizen’s guide to energy subsidies in Indonesia, 2012 update”, International Institute for
Sustainable Development, Global Subsidy Initiative, Report,
http://www.iisd.org/gsi/sites/default/files/indonesia_czguide_eng_update_2012.pdf.
IISD (2014), “Indonesia Energy Subsidy Review, Biannual Survey of energy subsidy policies“,
International Institute for Sustainable Development, Global Subsidy Initiative, Report, March 2014
http://www.iisd.org/gsi/sites/default/files/ffs_indonesia_review_i1v1.pdf.
ILO (2013), Cash transfer programmes, poverty reduction and empowerment of women: A comparative
analysis, International Labour Office, Working paper 4/2013.
Ivanic, M. (2004), Reconciliation of the GTAP and Household Survey Data, GTAP Technical paper 31.
Magné, B., J. Chateau, R. Dellink (2014), "Global implications of joint fossil fuel subsidy reform and
nuclear phase-out: an economic analysis", (supplementary material), Climatic Change, Vol 123(3-4),
pp 677-690.
Miranti, R., et al. (2013), "Trends in Poverty and Inequality in Decentralising Indonesia", OECD Social,
Employment and Migration Working Papers, No. 148, OECD Publishing, Paris.
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k43bvt2dwjk-en.
Mourougane, A. (2010), "Phasing Out Energy Subsidies in Indonesia", OECD Economics Department
Working Papers, No. 808, OECD Publishing, Paris.
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5km5xvc9c46k-en.
OECD (2011), Towards Green Growth, OECD Green Growth Studies, OECD Publishing, Paris.
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264111318-en.
OECD (2012), OECD Review of Agricultural Policies: Indonesia 2012, OECD Publishing, Paris.
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264179011-en

40

OECD (2013), Inventory of Estimated Budgetary Support and Tax Expenditures for Fossil Fuels 2013,
OECD Publishing, Paris. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264187610-en.
Pitt, M. (1983), “Equity, Externality and Energy Subsidies, The case of Kerosene in Indonesia”, Journal of
Development Economics Vol. 17(3), pp. 201-217.
Reimer, J. and T. Hertel (2003), International Cross Section Estimates of Demand for Use in the GTAP
Model, GTAP Working Papers 1190, Center for Global Trade Analysis, Department of Agricultural
Economics, Purdue University.
Rutherford, T., Tarr, D., and O. Shepotylo (2006), “The Impact on Russia of WTO Accession and The
Doha Agenda: The importance of liberalization of barriers against foreign direct investment in
services for growth and poverty reduction” in, Hertel, T. W. and L. A. Winters, (eds.) (2006).
Strauss, J., F. Witoelar, B. Sikoki and A. M. Wattie (2009), The Fourth Wave of the Indonesian Family
Life Survey (IFLS4): Overview and Field Report. April 2009. WR-675/1-NIA/NICHD.
UNECE (2011), Canberra Group Handbook on Household Income Statistics, United Nations Economic
Commission for Europe, Geneva.
Webster, M., S. Paltsev and J. Reilly (2008), "Autonomous efficiency improvement or income elasticity of
energy demand: Does it matter?", Energy Economics, Vol 30(6), pp 2785-2798.
Widodo, T., G. A. Sahadewo, S. U, Setiastuti and M. Chaerriyah (2012), “Cambodia’s Electricity Sector in
the Context of Regional Electricity Market Integration” in Wu, Y., X. Shi, and F. Kimura (eds.),
Energy Market Integration in East Asia: Theories, Electricity Sector and Subsidies, ERIA Research
Project Report 2011-17, Jakarta: ERIA, pp.173-206.
World Bank (2006), Making the new Indonesia work for the poor, The World Bank Washington D.C.
World Bank (2011), Indonesia Economic Quarterly, March 2011.
World Bank (2014), “Transitional policies to assist the poor while phasing out inefficient fossil fuel
subsidies that encourage wasteful consumption”, unpublished technical paper, August 2014.
Yusuf, A. A., Komarulzaman, A., Hermawan W. Hortono, D. and K. R. Sjahrir (2010), Scenarios for
Climate Change Mitigation from the Energy Sector in Indonesia: the Role of Fiscal Instruments,
Working Paper in Economics and development Studies, No. 201005, Department of Economics,
Padjadjaran University .
Yusuf, A. A. and B. P. Resosudarmo (2008), “Mitigating Distributional Impact of Fuel ¨Pricing Reform,
The Indonesian experience”, ASEAN Economic Bulletin, Vol. 25(1), pp. 32-47.

41

APPENDIX

A. GHG emissions and energy consumption in Indonesia
Table 9.

Historical GHG emissions by source in Indonesia
1990

2000

2005

2010

As % of GHG CAAGR* (% ) CAAGR* (% )
emissions in 2000-2005
2005-2010
2010
100
14
-7
84
15.27
-7.71
21
4.23
4.09
0
-7.92
-5.88
1
3.62
2.94
61
18.20
-10.46
11
9.12
-3.36
4
1.44
6.83
5
4.51
-0.82
3
4.94
2.03
0
78.03
-66.20
5
11.55
-10.23
3
6.17
-4.09
0
1.22
-1.81
1
21.98
-21.32
0
0.46
3.99

Total GHG
1101
1444
2829
1926
CO2 emissions
858
1185
2412
1615
Fuel Combustion
146
273
336
410
Fugitive
10
8
6
4
Industrial processes
8
13
15
18
Others**
694
891
2055
1183
CH4 emissions
152
168
260
219
Energy
37
46
49
68
Agriculture
82
79
98
94
Waste
26
40
51
56
Others***
7
3
62
0
N2O emissions
89
91
157
91
Agriculture
55
60
81
66
Energy and ind. processes
4
4
5
4
Others****
30
26
71
21
Other GHG (HFC, PFC, SF6)
2
1
1
1
* Compounded Average Annual Growth Rate
**Sum of direct emissions from tropical forest fires and of 10% of biofuel combustion emissions, which is the fraction assumed to be produced
unsustainably (IPCC Source/Sink Category 5).
***Includes industrial process emissions and tropical and temperate forest fires and other vegetation fires (IPCC Source/Sink Categories 2 and 5).
**** Others include N2O usage, tropical and temperate forest fires, and human sewage discharge and waste incineration (nonenergy) (IPCC
Source/Sink Categories 3, 5 and 6).
Source: IEA CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion Statistics

Table 10. Historical energy-related CO2 emissions by sector in Indonesia
1990

2000

2005

2011

CO2 emissions
146
273
Power generation
22
61
Other enrgy use
25
28
Industry
44
76
Transport
32
65
Other
23
43
* Compounded Average Annual Growth Rate

336
92
31
98
74
41

426
138
28
118
115
28

Source: IEA CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion Statistics
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% of CO2
emissions in
2011
100
32
6
28
27
7

CAAGR*
(% ) 20002005
4.23
8.43
2.55
5.19
2.61
-1.02

CAAGR*
(% ) 20052011
4.04
7.04
-2.10
3.14
7.60
-6.18

Table 11. Historical final energy demand and fuels for power generation in Indonesia
1990

Power generation (Mtoe)
Coal
Oil
Gas
Hydro
Biomass & Waste
Other renewables
Final consumption (Mtoe)
Coal
Oil
Gas
Electricity
Biomass & Waste
Industry (Mtoe)
Coal
Oil
Gas
Electricity
Biomass & Waste
Residential and services (Mtoe)
Oil
Gas
Electricity
Biomass & Waste
Transportation (Mtoe)
Oil
Gas
Other
Oil
Gas

2000

8.9
2.3
4.0
0.2
0.5
0.0
1.9
79.8
2.1
27.2
6.0
2.4
42.0
18.1
2.1
5.5
1.9
1.3
7.2
42.4
6.5
0.0
1.2
34.7
10.7
10.7
0.0
8.6
4.5
4.1

2005

28.0
8.4
4.6
5.8
0.9
0.0
8.4
120.3
4.7
49.0
11.5
6.8
48.3
30.6
4.6
9.3
5.2
2.9
8.6
54.6
11.0
0.0
3.9
39.7
21.9
21.9
0.0
13.2
6.9
6.3

39.2
13.4
9.3
4.1
0.9
0.0
11.4
134.2
8.3
53.4
13.6
9.3
49.6
35.5
8.3
10.1
7.1
3.7
6.3
59.1
10.2
0.0
5.6
43.3
25.1
25.1
0.0
14.5
8.1
6.5

2011

57.7
21.9
10.4
8.3
1.1
0.1
16.1
158.3
11.2
64.4
16.6
13.7
52.3
44.9
11.2
10.0
12.5
4.8
6.4
61.7
7.0
0.2
9.0
45.6
39.2
38.9
0.0
12.5
8.6
3.9

Share in
2011 (% )
100.0
37.9
17.9
14.3
1.8
0.1
27.9
100.0
7.1
40.7
10.5
8.7
33.0
100.0
25.0
22.2
27.9
10.6
14.2
100.0
11.3
0.3
14.6
73.9
100.0
99.2
0.1
100.0
68.9
31.1

CAAGR (% )
2000-2005
6.9
9.8
15.1
-6.6
1.4
29.7
6.3
2.2
12.4
1.7
3.4
6.4
0.5
3.0
12
2
6
5
-6
1.6
-1.6
3.0
7.6
1.8
2.8
2.8
-23.1
2.0
3.3
0.5

CAAGR (% )
2005-2011
6.7
8.5
1.7
12.3
2.5
44.2
6.0
2.8
5.1
3.2
3.4
6.8
0.9
4.0
5
0
10
4
0
0.7
-6.1
27.2
8.2
0.9
7.7
7.6
30.3
-2.5
1.1
-8.1

Source: IEA World Energy Statistics and Balances

B. Reconciliation of the budget survey and CGE data
The household-level information from the IFLS4 survey data and the national accounting data from the
CGE model (based on the GTAP 8.1 database) are reconciled in order to produce, for the base-year (2011),
a data set where individual incomes and expenditures are consistent with country-level totals. First, the
incomes and expenditure categories from the survey data are assigned to social accounting input-output
categories. This step involves matching the micro accounting categories of expenditures by function used
in the survey to the macro accounting categories of expenditures by commodities of the CGE model
(Ivanic, 2004). For instance, categories of goods whose consumption was reported in the survey have to be
mapped into the goods categories used in the CGE model. In a second step, the household survey data are
adjusted so as to ensure that, for each expenditure and incomes category, the sum over household is equal
to the country-level total. This procedure is based on two successive cross-entropy minimization
problems29: one for the incomes, one for the expenditures. As a result of these reconciliation processes, the
household-level data are adjusted, but the weights of each household in total consumption from the survey
29

See Golan and Judge (1996) for details about cross-entropy minimization problems.
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data are preserved. Additional adjustments have also been necessary in order to ensure that, at the
household level, the saving rates are consistent with the capital incomes.
B.1 Imputation of the survey incomes and expenditure to the social accounting categories
The expenditure part of the IFLS4 budget survey collects information on food, non-food goods and
services on a weekly base, household items monthly and durable goods bought in the analysed year. For
the sake of comparability with the national accounting data, the value of self-produced or not purchased
goods was not considered as part of total expenditures as well as gifts given outside the household (Reimer
and Hertel, 2003).
To map the survey’s categories into the detailed (25 items) product categories used in ENV-Linkages, the
approach used depended on the type of good considered. Special attention was paid to the imputation of
energy product consumptions and to housing service category.
On the energy goods part, the kerosene and the electricity expenditures could be obtained by a direct
mapping with the corresponding survey category. Given that the IFLS4 survey does not isolate
expenditures for gasoline, diesel and LPG, the expenditures for these products had to be extracted from
broader consumption categories using additional information included in the survey. For example, the
households owing a Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) stove, the LPG expenditure was approximated by
total fuel expenditures. The gasoline and diesel consumptions were derived from the transportation
expenditure categories of the survey (since the latter include the expenditures for “gasoline and the like”)
and from information about the vehicle ownership.
A specific imputation method is also used for housing service category. The survey provides a detailed
breakdown of expenditure components including actual housing rents and estimated ones for self-owned or
occupied dwellings. Special attention is devoted to the latter category that usually is not considered for the
income and expenditure computations in a micro framework. When rent is clearly a cost for tenants and it
contributes to income of housing owners, the macro framework, classifies the ownership of the dwellings
as an industry that sells housing services to tenants and receives a gross-rent at competitive prices
(UNECE, 2011). This value, net of current expenses, also enters in the income computation of housing
owners. In addition to the reconciliation of housing services with the classification of the national
accounting data, we built an imputation model to integrate few missing data (around 6% of the sample).
We followed the literature on the estimation of dwelling services (EC, 2010) that considers location and
household characteristics (rural/urban area, household size, availability of electric equipment and other
facilities) as main explanatory variables, and expresses the rent in a logarithmic scale to better capture the
non-linearity in the relation. Subsequently, we replaced the missing data with the average of generated
values across imputations.
For the other goods and services, a simplified imputation method, using two-steps was used. First, the
survey’s expenditures were mapped into 5 broad categories (agricultural products, food products,
manufactured goods, transportation and services). Then, the breakdown of these broad categories into the
more detailed ENV-linkages categories was done with a proportional allocation based on the aggregate
consumption structure in the ENV-linkages base year (2011) consumption expenditure for Indonesia.
The IFLS4 also collects information on total income received by all household’s members, surveying the
five main components of income: flows connected to economic activities (cash and in-kind), remuneration
due to assets ownership, value of services produced for own consumption, transfers and inter-household
flows (e.g. gifts). Expected, but not materialized earnings are excluded from income computation as well
as holding gains/losses and irregular gains: e.g. lottery winning and lump sum pensions (UNECE, 2011).
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The labour market section of IFLS4describes the occupation status of individuals (employed and selfemployed), the sector of occupation and the remuneration (wages and net-profits, respectively). For the
sake of micro-macro harmonization, the considered sectoral aggregation is: agriculture, electricity,
manufacturing, transportation, construction and services. When the information about occupation was
completely missing, we dropped the observation; instead, the missing yearly salary was integrated using
the monthly data multiplied by the number of working months in the year. Sectoral information, in addition
to province and urban/rural locations, was used for replacing the few left missing data using the
conditioned mean technique. The year-end bonuses were included in the computation of yearly wage.
The salary section of IFLS4 was merged with more specific information on net-profits of household
businesses (farm and non-farm). Regarding the farm activity, the difference between incomes and total
production costs was used to fill the numerous missing data gaps on net-profits. For firm businesses,
incomes used for household consumption were considered a more reliable estimate of net-profits; they
were elicited as the sum of “the value of production used for household consumption, the value of business
net income used on household expenditures and the amount of cash left over” (Strauss et al., 2009); when
missing, we used the net-profit data. Moreover, net-profits both for farm and non-farm businesses were
complemented taking into account yield loss experienced and income generated from other production
assets (purchases, sales and rent of land, livestock, buildings, etc.) in order to obtain the total income from
production.
The property income consists of the incomes generated by household financial and non-financial assets not
used in the production process. The imputed rent (net of housing costs) from owned/occupied dwellings is
an important component of income and is considered as the remuneration received for self-produced
services.
The incomes are more difficult to be matched with the Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) categories. The
main problems come from the choice of mapping procedure of business profits and wages from the survey
to capital, labour, natural resources and land remunerations in the SAM. Following Ivanic (2004), we
consider wages directly as labour remuneration as well as a portion of profits in farm and non-farm
business computed using the average wage, sector and region specific. The left over profits from business
and self-employed activities, in addition to property rents and dividends are accounted as generalised
capital factor remuneration (capital, land and natural resources). The repartition of this aggregate is
operated using the sector specific ratio of capital, land and natural resources coming from the CGE model.
The transfer aggregate includes monetary flows from government and non-profit institutions in the form of
conditional and non-conditional support programs. Only 300 households report positive transfers, therefore
for the other observations we imputed an average transfer depending on household size and income decile.
We excluded from the computation inter-household flows.
B.2 Reconciliation procedure
After the imputation process, the discrepancies between the aggregate numbers in the CGE model and the
total over households in the survey data have to be eliminated by reconciliation. A reconciliation procedure
was designed to fulfil the following requirements:
1.

The weight of each household in total consumption must be the same as in the household survey.

2.

For each good category, the total expenditure across households must add-up to the CGE baseyear representative household expenditure.

3.

For each income category (labour, capital, etc.), the total across the households must add-up to
the CGE base-year value.
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4.

At the household level, the total disposable income must be equal to the sum of expenditures and
savings.

5.

For all the households, the ratio between savings and capital incomes must be the same.

Condition (1) ensures that the distribution of total consumption between household in the household survey
will be preserved after reconciliation. Requirements (2) and (3) are standard accounting conditions for the
micro macro data reconciliation. But (4) was specified due to the inconsistencies observed at the household
level between declared incomes and expenditures. Last, (5) was imposed, for the sake of the multi-period
modelling exercise, in order to avoid in the baseline big reallocations of capital ownership between the
households. Such reallocation would have significantly affected the dynamic of inequalities in the baseline
and blurred the distributional analysis. A low savings rate is translated into a low marginal propensity to
save (see Appendix C) and consequently into low capital accumulation in the baseline scenario. Identical
savings to capital incomes ratios across households are used to avoid massive reallocation of capital
incomes from households with low initial saving rates and high contribution of capital in their income to
households with high saving rates with low initial contribution of capital in their income. One side
consequence of this assumption is that there are no households with negative savings after the
reconciliation.
The reconciliation procedure used to meet the five requirements was based on cross-entropy minimization
problems (Golan and Judge, 1996) and can be summarized as follows. First, the expenditures are
reconciled using cross entropy. Then, the household-level capital incomes and savings are computed by
allocating the CGE model aggregate saving proportionally to the share of each household in total capital
incomes as observed in the survey. Last, the non-capital incomes of households are reconciled with the
survey using cross entropy minimization.
C. Calibration of the household’s preferences parameters based on the survey
Each household group h containing population poph has the following type of utility function30:

uh  mpch,i ·ln(ch,i  poph ·h,i )  mpsh ·ln(sh  pophh,s )
i

with ch ,i the consumption of good i, and sh the savings. The preference parameters are the marginal
propensities to consume mpch ,i , the marginal propensity to save mpch ,i and adjustment parameters  h ,i ,
and  h , s .
The household’s demand for consumption good and the saving behaviour results from the utility
maximization under budget constraint:



(ch , sh )  argmax u (ch , sh ) |  pi ch,i  sh  yd h 
i


The optimal demand for good i and the savings are given by:

30

This form is very close to the utility function used for ELES demand system. The main difference is the adjustment
term  h , s for savings. This term is used here to make possible the survey replication for alternative Frisch
parameters. This property would allow us to do sensitivity analysis on the price elasticities by changing the
Frisch parameters.
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ch,i  poph · h,i 

mpch,i
pi

( yd h   pi h,i   h, s )
i

sh  poph ·h,s  mpsh ( yd h   pi h,i   h,s )
i

The household-group utility functions are calibrated on the consumption in volume ( ch ,i ), consumption
good prices31, ( pi ) and savings ( sh ) taken from the reconciled survey; and also based on assumptions
about the income elasticities of demand (  h ,i ) and income elasticity of savings ( h , s ) and for the Frisch
parameter ( frh ). By default, the Frisch parameters are equal for all the households, and the income
elasticity parameters are based on the value used for the representative household in the standard version of
the model.
First, the marginal propensities to consume and to save are:

mpch,i  h,i ·

pi ch,i
yd h,i

mpsh  h ,s ·

,

sh
yd h

Then, based on the Frisch parameter, the  parameters are calibrated with formulas

31

 h,i  (ch,i  mpci

yd h
) / poph
pi ·( frh )

 h,s  ( sh  mps

yd h
) / poph
pi ·( frh )

The consumptions in volume are retrieved from the households expenditures using the CGE price base year price.
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D. The model’s decomposition algorithm

Iteration k

Iteration k+1
k+1

Macroeconomic submodel
Solve the CGE model with a single representative
household whose utility function is calibrated with
parameters i( k ) , mpci( k ) and mps ( k ) :





U ( k )   mpci( k ) ·ln(Ci  Pop·i( k ) )  mps ( k ) ·ln(S )
i

Recalibration of the representative
household utility function parameters to
i( k 1) , mpci( k 1) , mps ( k 1)

Disposable income YD

(k )

so that Ci( k ) and S ( k ) are reproduced for
prices pi( k ) and disposable income YD

Final prices ( pi( k ) )

(k )

(k )

Factor incomes ( w j )

Total consumption of good i: Ci( k )   ch( k,i)
h

Total transfers ( trg ( k ) )

Total savings: S ( k )   sh( k )
h

Household microsimulation submodel:
Household-group disposable incomes yd h are computed based on
household- groups shares of total endowments of each production
factors (  h , j ) and shares in total entitlement for transfers from the
government (  h,trg ); and deducing the income tax and factor taxes
(rates  h and  h , j ):

ydh( k )  (1   h ) ( wh( k, j) .h, j X j (1   h, j )  h ,trg trg ( k ) ) .
h

(k )

(k )

The household-group consumptions and savings ( ch,i , sh ) are
computed from the utility maximization problems:
Max{uh (ch,i , sh ) |  pi .ch,i  sh  yd h( k ) }
k
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E. Regional effects of a multilateral phase out of energy consumption subsidies
Figure 23 displays impacts of the multilateral phase out of energy consumption subsidies on regional real
incomes at horizon 2020. The gains at the world level reach 0.33% with respect to the baseline. Many of
the regions that benefit most from the subsidy reform are in Asia, because of a their high initial level of
energy consumption subsidies, the high energy intensity of their industry, their dependence on energy
imports and their openness to trade. The Middle East, which is the main energy exporter, also benefits
from the policy. On the one hand, it is the region where the energy subsidies are substantially larger than in
other regions, implying a large positive efficiency effect from their removal. But this is mitigated by a
negative effect through oil markets as the multilateral energy consumption subsidy reform tends to depress
on global oil prices. However, the latter effect is rather limited in 2020 and the efficiency effect dominates.
The regions that are negatively affected by the reform are energy exporters. These results are largely in line
with those commented more deeply in Magné et al. (2014). The magnitude of the impacts appears different
in both studies, as the results presented here are for the year 2020, while Magné et al. (2014) highlighted
consequences in 2035.
Figure 23.

Impact of a multilateral energy consumption subsidy phase out on regional real income in 2020
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Source: Authors' calculations based on ENV-Linkages

Figure 24 shows that the multilateral phase out of energy consumption subsidies leads to 3% global GHG
emission reduction at horizon 2020 relative to the baseline. The reduction is driven mostly by non-OECD
countries (-4.5%). Emissions in the OECD countries slightly increase (0.9%) as a result of lower
international energy prices. The regions whose emissions decrease most are those with the highest initial
energy consumption subsidies as a proportion of GDP (see Figure 2), specifically Middle-East, FSU and
Eastern Europe, Indonesia and non-OECD Latin America.
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Figure 24.

Impact of a multilateral energy consumption subsidy phase out on regional GHG emissions in
2020
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Note: these GHG emissions do not include the emissions from tropical forest fires and the 10% of biofuel combustion emissions, which is
the fraction assumed to be produced unsustainably
Source: Authors' calculations based on ENV-Linkages

F. Data availability issue for extending the distributional analysis to other countries
In theory the type of analysis presented in this paper can be generalized to other countries and to various
topics related to environmental tax reform. But such analysis is made difficult by the lack of availability of
suitable international harmonized micro data on households’ incomes and expenditures that is publicly
available (see Table 12). The OECD Center for Tax policy and Administration (CTP) has an elaborated
and harmonized data set (Flues and Thomas, Forthcoming), mostly based on confidential micro data
provided by Eurosat. The publicly available Eurostat data and other cross country sources lack of detail in
terms of number household quantile groups and give very partial or no information on energy
expenditures.

50

Table 12. Main sources of cross country households income and expenditure data
OECD Center for tax policy Cross-national data center in
and administration
Luxembourg (LIS)*
(OECD/CTP)

Eurostat website*

ILO Laborstat*

Type of data

Micro data including income Micro data on incomes and
and expenditure
expenditures

Energy consumption categories

several

no

Accessibility

Confidential

On request. Only aggregated
indicators can be loaded

data on expenditures per data on income and
quintiles and mostly per expenditure per, the
quintile
number of quantiles is in
bracket
a single category
single category including
including electricity, gas fuel and lighting
and other fuels
Publicly available
Publicly available

Country coverage**
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Brazil
Bulgaria
Canada
Chile
China
Columbia
Czech Rep
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
India
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Japan
Luxembourg
Mexico
Netherland
Norway
New Zealand
Poland
Portugal
Russia
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
South Africa
South Korea
Spain
Switzerland
Sweden
Chinese Taipei
Turkey
UK
Turkey
USA
Sources

2003
2004
2000
2011

2009
2010

1998-1998 (10)
2005
2005

2001 (10)

2005

2004 (10)

2005
2005
2005
2005
2005
2005
2005
2005

2003 (10)
2001-2003 (10)
2004 (5)
2001 (10)
2001 (10)

2010
2012
2002
2010
2004
2010
2010
2010
2005
2010
2010
2005
2010
2004
2010
2010

2010
2010
2012
2011
2008
2010
2010

2004
2010
2010
2004

2010

2010
2011

2010
2010

see Flues and Thomas.
(Forthcoming)

2008
2008
2010
2010
2010
2010

1999

2004

2005
2005

2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2004
2005
2010

2010
2010

2005

2010
2010
2004
http://www.lisdatacenter.org/

2003 (10)
2001-2003 (4)
2003.0

2005
2005
2005

2002 (10)
2000 (10)
2002 (6)
2003 (5)

2005
2005

2005

2004 (10)
2002 (10)
2003 (10)

2005
2005
2005

ec.europa.eu/eurostat

2003 (10)
2003-2004 (10)
2003 (10)
http://laborsta.ilo.org/STP/
guest

Notes * The description correspond to the data as they where in July 1014. ** The year corresponds to the year of the survey. For ILO data, the figures in
brackets correspond to the number of quantile for which income of expenditures data are available

Source: Authors’ review
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